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Abstract 
 
The Post-Cold War began an era of decline in the nuclear enterprise. Leaders 
were risk-averse in fear of being fired for making mistakes, the nuclear culture lost its 
experts, organizations were drawn to the conventional fight, and training and education 
lacked the priority necessary to rebuild the nuclear enterprise. In 2007 and 2008 two 
major incidents occurred, a necessary evil to bring focus and priority back to the nuclear 
enterprise. Several reports were accomplished to identify the issues and make 
recommendations. Some recommendations are successful and some are failures.  
The purpose of this paper is identify the successful traits in the process to improve 
it for follow-on recommendations. Once the basic process was identified, a method was 
applied to formalize it. The method used for this research paper is critical success factors 
for the implementation and key performance indicators for assessment. Even though a 
process and method is identified to ensure the success of an implementation, if not 
properly followed the chances of success drastically decrease. If the organization 
identifies the wrong critical success factors or does not continually assess key 
performance indicators the implemented program will likely fail.  
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Improving the Nuclear Reform Implementation for Success 
I. Introduction 
 “With the end of the Cold War, and the sharply reduced likelihood of a nuclear 
exchange, awareness of the role and power of nuclear weapons has diminished. But their 
power and uniqueness endure—and must again be clearly understood if they are to play 
their crucial role in nuclear deterrence.” 
-James Schlesinger 
 
During the Cold War (1947-1991), the nuclear mission was the priority of the 
United States (U.S.) in order to safeguard itself against the Soviet Union. Then Post-Cold 
War, the U.S. decided to shift its focus to conventional operations, allowing the nuclear 
mission to go into hibernation. In 2007 and 2008, two significant events occurred that 
challenged the credibility of the U.S. nuclear enterprise. These events prompted DoD to 
take a serious look at the nuclear enterprise and implement some major changes. 
Department of Defense stood-up Air Force Global Strike Command, created Strategic 
Deterrence and Nuclear Integration (Headquarter Air Force A10), and the restructured the 
education and training programs. Just as the nuclear enterprise started to gain some 
momentum it nearly lost its effectiveness in 2014 when the cheating scandals in both the 
U.S. Air Force and Navy shocked the nation. Due to these setbacks it is more important 
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than ever to ensure the nuclear reform implementations are successful to maintain the 
credibility of the nuclear enterprise. 
The purpose of this research is to recommend a process for nuclear reform 
recommendations to be implemented successfully, to include sustainment of the 
organization or program after it is fully operational. First, using the decision making 
process, we will start with how an issue becomes a recommendation and then becomes 
implemented. Before the implementation becomes operational, a series of steps will have 
to be accomplished to ensure its success. The first five steps, described in Chapter 3, will 
be accomplished using the Critical Success Factor (CSF) method. The CSFs are the few 
key areas where “things must go right” in order for an organization to succeed (Bullen 
and Rockart 1981). Once the CSFs have been achieved the organization or program is on 
its way to a successful start. At this point the organization or implementation is ready to 
become fully operational. Once fully operational, the organization or program needs to be 
continually assessed to ensure it remains successful. Key performance indicators (KPIs), 
a five step process, are the measurable values used to ensure the organization is achieving 
its key goals (Lorette 2016).  
The appropriate plan allows an organization to successfully implement a 
recommendation and sustain it. Several well-known reports such as the Welch-Harvey 
Report, Schlesinger Report, Creedon-Fanta Report, and others, have highlighted issues 
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within the nuclear enterprise. Lefort, McMurray and Tesvic (2015) surveyed over 2,200 
executives in 900 companies and found that the elements that have the greatest bearing 
on successful implementation of change are ownership and commitment, prioritization, 
and sufficient resources and capabilities. The Welch-Harvey Report also discovered the 
disconnect between ownership, passion, and dedication had a negative effect on the 
nuclear mission (Department of Defense 2014). The reports revealed an alarming number 
of issues in the nuclear enterprise. These issues affected the unit level to the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense (OSD) and junior enlisted to senior officers and civilians. Following 
the incidents in 2007 and 2008, several reports were published. These reports are the 
main data source for this research. 
 A key issue identified by the reports was the failure of leadership in the nuclear 
enterprise. A contributing factor for this failure is the lack of experienced leaders, which 
was seen during the institutional shift from bomber generals to fighter generals 
(Schlesinger, Carns, et al., DoD Nuclear Weapons Managment Phase I: The AF's Nuclear 
Mission 2008). This shift challenged Air Force leadership supporting the nuclear mission 
and as a result there was “a generation of Airmen without inspirational leadership that 
could motivate an organization to believe in the deterrent value of the nuclear forces.” 
(Spencer, Ludin and Nelson 2012).  
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 The nuclear enterprise also failed to develop its culture into an operationally 
focused environment. The nuclear enterprise was focused on perfect test scores, 
inspection preparation, metrics, and quick fixes rather than mission accomplishment and 
operational effectiveness (Schlesinger, Carns, et al., DoD Nuclear Weapons Management 
Phase I: The AF’s Nuclear Mission 2008, U.S. Air Force Nuclear Task Force 2008, 
Spencer, Ludin, and Nelson 2012). Inspection and test results were used to reward or 
punish, instead of in preparation for mission readiness. As a result, the United States Air 
Force (USAF) started to train to inspections and not the mission, whereas the United 
States Navy (USN) looked at inspections as way to correct errors and learn from their 
mistakes.  
 After Strategic Air Command (SAC) stood down, no single organization in the 
USAF was responsible for the nuclear mission. Since then, several efforts were made to 
improve the USAF’s organization to ensure nuclear enterprise initiatives were sustained; 
Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC) stood up, Assistant Chief of Staff for 
Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration (A10) in Headquarters Air Force (HAF) 
was created, and the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center focused its attention on the 
execution and support of nuclear forces (Department of Defense 2014). Despite these 
attempts, the USAF is still struggling to find the right organizational structure to maintain 
the nuclear enterprise.  
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 The Schlesinger Report stated that after the Cold War ended, both training and 
education in the nuclear enterprise were cut back to the point of near elimination 
(Schlesinger, Carns, et al., DoD Nuclear Weapons Managment Phase I: The AF's Nuclear 
Mission 2008). The lack of training is more noticeable at units that have dual-capable 
aircraft (capable of delivering nuclear and conventional munitions). The use of strategic 
bombers in conventional missions has highlighted the ascendency of conventional forces 
and the declining relevance of the nuclear mission (Spencer, Ludin and Nelson 2012). 
When the mission focus shifted to conventional operations, so did the training.  
Background  
The end of the Cold War (1947-1991) had a profound effect on the nuclear 
enterprise and nuclear culture within the military. The U.S. Department of Defense’s 
(DoD) nuclear enterprise is comprised of a strategic triad: USAF intercontinental ballistic 
missiles (ICBMs), USAF nuclear bombers, and USN ballistic missile submarines. Post-
Cold War, the nuclear mission went into hibernation as the strategic focus of the nation 
shifted to conventional warfare and special operations, which were considered primary to 
winning the war on terrorism. With that in mind, in 1992, SAC was replaced by a new 
tactical command known as Air Combat Command (ACC). Upon activation of ACC, all 
bombers, reconnaissance platforms, battle management resources, and ICBMs were 
transferred to ACC. The transfer of all bombers and ICBMs to this new command 
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marked the end of the Air Force’s dedication to the nuclear mission (Schlesinger, Carns, 
et al., DoD Nuclear Weapons Managment Phase I: The AF's Nuclear Mission 2008). To 
emphasize this point, a senior leader commented that the USAF went from doing the 
nuclear mission 24 hours a day and 7 days a week, to a “part-time task.” (Department of 
Defense 2014). The USAF was not the only service to suffer. In 2013, the USN retired its 
Tomahawk Land Attack Missile-Nuclear, leaving them with just one nuclear missile, 
Trident II. 
Since the beginning of the tactically focused war on terrorism in 2002, the nuclear 
enterprise has endured several major incidents. The first incident occurred in 2006, when 
classified parts were accidently shipped to Taiwan. According to the report titled “The 
Unauthorized Movement of Nuclear Weapons and Mistaken Shipment of Classified 
Missile Components: An Assessment”, inexperience and not properly following 
procedures led to classified parts being labeled as helicopter batteries, which the Defense 
Logistics Agency then shipped to Taiwan (Spencer, Ludin and Nelson 2012). The error 
wasn’t discovered until 2007 when the Taiwanese finally opened the crate, and notified 
U.S. officials, who promptly recovered the items. During the same year, an unauthorized 
movement of six nuclear warheads occurred on a B-52 flight from Minot AFB, ND to 
Barksdale AFB, LA. An assessment concluded that throughout the entire transfer, a series 
of missed checklist steps, a lack of oversight and experience, and complacency were 
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contributing factors (Spencer, Ludin and Nelson 2012). The most recent incident was in 
2014, when USN nuclear reactor operators and USAF nuclear missile crews were caught 
cheating during nuclear certification exams. These three major failures in the nuclear 
enterprise are not all inclusive, but they were the most significant. 
Problem Statement 
 The end of the Cold War brought significant changes to the nuclear enterprise and 
to the global security environment. This led the USAF and USN to restructure their 
combat forces, and to focus on tactical, conventional and special operations. In a 2008 
report to the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), James Schlesinger stated: 
Changes made by the Air Force after the Cold War were in response to the 
defense downsizing of the 1990s as well as national leadership priorities. 
During that time, the Air Force and other services were experiencing 
severe resource constraints… With less national emphasis on nuclear 
weapons during this period, the Air Force failed to grasp the continued 
need to maintain a viable airpower-based nuclear deterrent capability. 
Moreover, as the size of the nuclear arsenal was reduced and emphasis 
shifted to conventional missions, the Air Force failed to articulate the 
continuing value of the nuclear deterrent (Schlesinger, Carns, et al., DoD 
Nuclear Weapons Managment Phase I: The AF's Nuclear Mission 2008) 
 
In 1992, the USAF implemented its largest organizational change since its inception, 
leading to splitting of the nuclear enterprise from centralized SAC control to the eventual 
division of bombers and ICBMs between ACC and Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) 
(U.S. Air Force Nuclear Task Force 2008). In 1995, Base Realignment and Closure 
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reduced the nuclear system resources further, and support organizations were closed and 
dispersed, thus adding to the atrophy. As a result, organizations were consolidated and 
absorbed the nuclear mission by default. Nuclear proficiency and nuclear-experienced 
operators and technicians eroded. The mission focus shifted to perfecting tactical 
conventional operations, while limited attention was paid to merely passing nuclear 
inspections and testing, although perfect results were still expected. The USAF failed to 
keep the nuclear mission ‘operationally current,’ thus forcing it into a ‘care-taker’ status 
with little to no modernization or recapitalization. (U.S. Air Force Nuclear Task Force 
2008). 
Research Purpose 
Numerous reports have identified issues within the nuclear enterprise and made 
recommendations to remedy them, with mixed implementation results. This research 
paper will take an analytical approach to find the key factors in successful 
implementation.  
To help find the key factors, the following investigative questions will be 
addressed: 
1) What process is used to get a recommendation implemented? 
2) How does the nuclear enterprise define success? 
3) How are implementations assessed once they are sustained?  
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 Methodology 
The methodology used for this research is a combination of case study and CSF 
analysis. The CSF method, refined by John F. Rockart in 1979, is used to identify key 
areas where ‘things must go right’ for an organization to be successful (Bullen and 
Rockart 1981). Once the CSFs have been identified, KPIs are used to continually assess if 
the CSFs are being achieved. The CSFs and KPIs all have a development process, which 
will be described in later chapters.  
The recommendations were organized into four categories, which were predefined 
by the reports. Once the recommendations were categorized, they were checked to see if 
they were implemented. Once verified, the implementations were assessed through a 
survey sent to senior leaders in the nuclear enterprise, and confirmed with objective 
reports and articles. This data was compiled to identify key factors in successful reforms 
within the nuclear enterprise. 
Limitations  
A limitation for the research is the classification level of some reports. The USN’s 
nuclear incident reports are classified. To keep this research unclassified, it will be 
primarily focused on the USAF, since the majority of its reports are unclassified. Another 
advantage of using USAF reports, is they provide more detail about implementation 
results. It was feasible to obtain enough information to conduct an analysis and make 
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recommendations. Another limitation was gathering the updated status of nuclear 
reforms. There is one organization, OSD Cost Assessments and Programs Evaluation 
(CAPE), that tracks the status of nuclear reform recommendations. However, most of 
their data is classified and For Official Use Only (FOUO). Lastly, AFGSC’s Program 
Action Directive is FOUO, so this research does not use specific information from that 
document.   
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II. Literature Review 
 “For 70 years, we have deterred and assured. And while our nation's nuclear 
enterprise is safe, secure and effective, we cannot take it for granted any longer.” 
-Admiral Cecil Haney, Commander of U.S. Strategic Command  
 
Chapter Overview 
With the end of the Cold War the erosion of the nuclear enterprise started and 
several major incidents occurred, which resulted in numerous reports recommending how 
to get the nuclear enterprise healthy again. In the late 1990s to the early 2000s, various 
nuclear reform reports were written to identify issues in the nuclear enterprise. Although 
the reports made recommendations to resolve the issues, these recommendations were 
mostly ignored. Between 2001 and 2007 over 235 nuclear deficiencies (almost 100 at 
Minot and Barksdale) were reported by ACC (M. Hoffman 2008). Most of the 
deficiencies were considered routine and were ignored. In 2007 and 2008 two major 
setbacks occurred in the nuclear enterprise. After the first major incident in 2007, a call to 
reinvigorate the nuclear enterprise was badly needed, so another round of reports was 
written. The reports were derived from DoD’s Task Force committees which were 
chaired by a former Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Defense Science Board, 
retired generals and admirals with steep nuclear experience, OSD, and Rand Corp. The 
findings and recommendations were similar to the previously published reports. This time 
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DoD took the recommendations seriously and the USAF “implemented extraordinary 
measures in their nuclear enterprise following two incidents in 2007 and 2008.” (Defense 
Science Board 2013).  
Nuclear Enterprise 
The nuclear enterprise is defined by the 2011 Nuclear Matters Handbook as the 
community of people and organizations throughout the federal government responsible 
for maintaining U.S. nuclear weapon deterrence (Office of the Deputy Assistant to the 
Secretary of Defense 2011). To further elaborate on the term, the nuclear enterprise 
consists of the people, organizations, processes, procedures, and systems that are used to 
conduct, execute, and support nuclear operations and forces (U.S. Air Force Nuclear Task 
Force 2008). 
The nuclear enterprise is important to maintain, because the United States’ 
strategic deterrence heavily depends on the nuclear triad and all of the agencies and 
organizations that help contribute to the mission. Although the nation’s dependence on 
nuclear weapons has been reduced, nuclear weapons still remain fundamental to 
deterrence. A high level of attention and resources are still necessary to keep this 
capability credible. With such a responsibility and destructive power, the DoD’s nuclear 
enterprise is always under the scrutiny of Congress and the public eye. 
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Leadership 
An effective leader creates inspiring visons and ideals to motivate his or her 
people. A leader also conveys to their subordinates how they contribute to the mission, 
why their work is important, and that they are valued people. In the past two decades 
senior leadership lost sight and the decisions they made have had the cumulative effect of 
jeopardizing the nuclear enterprise’s deterrent capability. In the USAF, leaders failed to 
shift priorities, adjust policies, and maintain the resources needed for a potent nuclear 
effectiveness.  
In the early 1990s, the decline in nuclear experienced leaders would begin to take 
its toll on the nuclear enterprise. Throughout the years the DoD did not identify the issue 
and eventually failed to groom the next generation of nuclear experienced leaders. For 
example, Air Force Nuclear Task Force stated that some key nuclear billets are not filled 
by personnel with nuclear backgrounds; therefore, the billets are filled by personnel with 
no prior nuclear experience (U.S. Air Force Nuclear Task Force 2008). As the “new” 
generation of senior leaders, both civilian and military, filled nuclear positions they often 
relied on legacy experience to be successful in the nuclear enterprise (Schlesinger, Carns, 
et al., DoD Nuclear Weapons Managment Phase I: The AF's Nuclear Mission 2008). 
With the issue unnoticed and the focus on conventional missions, this atrophy of 
experience would continue to plague DoD for another two decades and become an 
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underlying factor for the numerous nuclear incidents. This issue highlights the need for 
USAF leaders to receive formal nuclear training; however, the nuclear mission and 
strategy are seldom taught in professional military education (PME). Nuclear experience 
is crucial for leaders to reduce the reliance on informal methods of learning and to help 
them make effective decisions. Without the nuclear experience or knowledge, senior 
leadership in the DoD and the nuclear enterprise cannot effectively convey the 
importance of the mission in the U.S. defense policy (Department of Defense 2014).  
Recommendations to increase nuclear experience were made by several reports. 
One specific recommendation was that the USAF needs to formalize a career 
development plan for personnel in the nuclear enterprise and provide them with the depth 
and breadth of experience necessary to become effective leaders in the nuclear enterprise 
(U.S. Air Force Nuclear Task Force 2008). This recommendation was implemented and a 
review of Air Education and Training Command (AETC) courseware was accomplished. 
Additional nuclear courses were added to AETC’s courseware and is now introduced 
earlier in enlisted and officers PME. Other classes on nuclear matters were created as 
well. For example, Nuclear 400 is a course offered by Air University’s 
Counterproliferation Center (CPC). This is a two day course that teaches the internal 
workings of the nuclear enterprise to O6s, E9s, and General and Flag Officers (USAF 
Counterproliferation Center at The Air University 2013). Defense Threat Reduction 
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Agency (DTRA) also offers orientation courses in the nuclear enterprise. Their courses 
are open for any service member or civilian to attend. These are just two examples of the 
courses now offered to educate current and future leaders on the nuclear enterprise.  
Another recommendation made was that the commander of AETC should conduct 
a review of all Air Force PME curriculum and expand education to include nuclear 
deterrence, strategy, and operational theory (Schlesinger, Carns, et al., DoD Nuclear 
Weapons Managment Phase I: The AF's Nuclear Mission 2008). After this 
recommendation was made, Air University, HAF A1 (manpower, personnel, and 
services), and a panel of functional and major command representatives worked in 
conjunction to review the PME curriculum. A stair-stepped approach was taken to 
revamp the nuclear education system across the continuum of education from basic to 
advanced courses (U.S. Air Force Nuclear Task Force 2008). The Secretary of Defense’s 
Task Force recommended all nuclear matter courses should be offered to all troops, 
regardless of rank or service. For example, several Major Commands (MAJCOMs) have 
created a nuclear course specific for their training needs. The United States Air Force in 
Europe (USAFE) has created Nuclear University, which trains technicians on USAFE 
storage and security system (WS3) vaults. Air University’s CPC developed several 
nuclear courses for mid-level to upper-level leaders and supervisors involved in the 
nuclear mission. Air Force Space Command’s 20th Air Force ICBM Center of 
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Excellence provides training specifically focused on the ICBM mission, which includes 
operations, maintenance, and security forces. All of these training initiatives are 
important, but they reside in separate MAJCOMs. This makes it difficult to allow cross 
pollination of training and to capitalize on any synergy within the nuclear enterprise.  
The next issue identified as a leadership failure is the “say-do gap”. The “say-do 
gap” sends mixed messages to the troops who execute the mission on a daily basis. The 
Independent Review of the DoD Enterprise states senior leadership expresses that the 
nuclear mission is top priority and uniquely important, but the nuclear forces experience 
shortages in resources, have unqualified personnel, have inadequate facilities, and have 
funding shortages. It is difficult to inspire and lead from the front when the nuclear force 
hears one thing and perceives another. The “say-do gap” is reinforced with the nuclear 
modernization gap between the U.S. and other nuclear weapon states. The U.S. is 
stagnant with its nuclear programs, while Russia and China are advancing in their nuclear 
programs (Insinna and Parsons 2013).  
A recommendation for leadership at all levels is to give the force full commitment 
to eliminate the “say-do gap” and increase communication (Department of Defense 
2014). This means the leaders must take ownership and responsibility for their actions. 
Senior leaders must also consistently emphasize the vital contribution the nuclear mission 
makes to the U.S. strategic deterrence (U.S. Air Force Nuclear Task Force 2008). An 
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update to these recommendations is AFGSC’s force improvement program (FIP), which 
was originally initiated for the ICBM community, but now extends to the bomber 
community as well. The FIP team is comprised of operations, maintenance, security 
forces, and mission support members from different MAJCOMs and AFGSC wings 
(Pampe 2014). The team conducts field surveys, leadership surveys, and collects inputs 
from the Airmen executing the day-to-day mission (Pampe 2014). Once the survey 
results have been assessed, a list of concerns and recommendations will be presented to 
AFGSC and numbered Air Force (NAF) commanders. Since the inception of the FIP, “it 
has evolved into a philosophy of continuous assessment and improvement that empowers 
Airmen who perform the nuclear mission and seeks to continue changing and improving 
the nuclear culture.” (Air Force News Service 2014). One example of this bottom-up 
approach, FIP, at work is the ICBM community. The ICBM crewmember’s initial 
assignment progression was to spend three years in the unit and then go to a career 
broadening tour, which most likely was not nuclear related. It was very unlikely that the 
crewmember would return back to the ICBM community. Post FIP, the plan calls for a 
“3+3” where the crewmember spends his or her first three years focusing on becoming a 
weapon expert in his or her primary job and then the next three years upgrading to 
instructor, evaluator, or flight commander. The FIP also identified a need for more mid-
level officers in the missile units, so Assistant Director of Operations positions were 
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created to help manage the Airmen. Some other examples of FIP working for the Airmen 
are; updated tools and equipment for maintainers and cold weather gear and weapon 
improvements for security forces (Department of the Air Force 2015). 
The third attribute for leadership failure is risk-aversion. The perception of 
relieving commanders as a result of an error or mistake found during a nuclear inspection 
or the lapse of judgement of a subordinate has created risk-averse leaders (Department of 
Defense 2014). The perception that single mistake can get a wing commander fired, has 
increased leadership’s involvement in the inspection process to the point of 
micromanagement. The Independent Review of the DoD Nuclear Enterprise states that 
there are two main problems with leadership avoiding risk. First, when a leader is risk-
averse he or she pushes the authority and decisions up the chain of command, thus 
delaying the decision-making process and ultimately undermining his or her own 
confidence. The second issue was creating programs to monitor and evaluate. This 
initiative undermines confidence, delays work, and devalues the qualification of the 
troops performing the mission (Department of Defense 2014). It may initially reduce the 
risk of errors or mistakes, but in the long run it is a drain on the already undermanned 
nuclear force. Each time there is an error, even the most minuscule, it requires an increase 
in monitoring or evaluating, which ultimately takes focus away from the mission 
(Department of Defense 2014). “Leaders’ focus on identifying root causes once a single 
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major problem emerges, but do not adequately consider and assess indicators and trends 
that provide a holistic view of the force.” (Department of Defense 2014). Risk-averse 
cultures tend to avoid risk until the problem becomes a major concern and by then it’s too 
late to address or fix. The unauthorized nuclear weapons movement and the classified 
parts shipment to Taiwan are two results of what risk-averse leaders cultivated (Spencer, 
Ludin and Nelson 2012).  
A recommendation made by DoD is to reduce or eliminate risk-averse leadership 
styles. The Secretaries of the Armed Forces must provide guidance that the first priority 
for MAJCOM commanders is to empower those commanders under them, who execute 
the nuclear mission, and convey that there is no place for risk of criticism above the risk 
of the mission (Department of Defense 2014). For the MAJCOM level commanders, they 
must empower all levels of command to use expertise and judgement to successfully 
execute the mission within guidelines and directives (Department of Defense 2014). 
Secondly the USAF should not punish for mistakes, but instead allow the leader time to 
correct them. The DoD’s Internal Nuclear Enterprise Review recommended to stop firing 
leaders and let them learn from their mistakes and the mistakes of their organizations 
(Department of Defense 2014). This enforces the ideal that mistakes will happen and it 
does not necessarily mean a punishment will ensue. Lastly, to develop a culture of growth 
and learning, educate the force as to why leaders are relieved of command.  
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A result of risk-averse leaders is the demand for perfection in the troops’ 
performance. The nuclear mission is unique and it needs to have high standards and 
perfection in most aspects, but what the troops perceive are leaders who demand micro-
perfection, known as zero-defect. This zero-defect is expected in every aspect of their 
mission from operations to administration (Schlesinger, Carns, et al., DoD Nuclear 
Weapons Management Phase II: Review of the DoD Nuclear Mission 2008). Airmen 
were forced to focus on correcting the symptoms of failures, rather than identifying the 
root causes and implementing enduring solutions. Based on Admiral Donald’s (the 
former Director of Navy Nuclear Propulsion and Deputy Administrator of National 
Nuclear Security Administration’s Naval Reactors) investigation this practice led to 
informal technical order guidance and straying away from the formal steps and guidance 
(Schlesinger, Carns, et al., DoD Nuclear Weapons Managment Phase I: The AF's Nuclear 
Mission 2008). The Independent Review of the DoD Nuclear Enterprise also observed 
just to reduce the risk of external criticism, that zero-defect is unnecessary (Department 
of Defense 2014). For example, in a weapons storage area there is a false assumption that 
a 30-year-old weapon will have zero cosmetic defects. To maintain a flawless weapon 
like it was new from the factory is not achievable (Defense Science Board 2011). The 
practice of perfection should be a goal, but it has become an unrealistic standard that the 
commander pushes their troops to meet (Department of Defense 2014). The USAF 
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expects perfection all of the time, which drives a culture of excessive preparation, even to 
the point where it detracts from the mission, undermines trust, inhibits learning, and 
erodes morale (Department of Defense 2014). This practice led the ICBM community to 
an unhealthy level of distrust.  
The recommendations for leaders who expect 100 percent perfection all the time, 
is similar to the recommendations for the risk-averse leader. The Secretaries of the 
Armed Forces need to provide guidance, that a high priority for the commanders is to 
empower those who work for them, so that they can execute the nuclear mission 
effectively and efficiently with zero tolerance (Department of Defense 2014). If an error 
or mistake does occur the suggested action is not to punish the individual or unit, but 
instead correct it with additional training, hands-on supervision, or provide clearer 
guidance (Department of Defense 2014). 
Culture  
 Culture is comprised of beliefs and customs. It is a way of thinking, behaving, or 
working in an organization (Gibson, et al. 2012). Leadership fosters culture and can 
directly influence it as well (Gibson, et al. 2012). The nuclear enterprise failed to develop 
its culture into a thriving environment. It lacked experience, lost focus, fell short on 
accountability, and was conditioned to an eroding culture (Schlesinger, Carns, et al., DoD 
Nuclear Weapons Managment Phase I: The AF's Nuclear Mission 2008).  
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During the Cold War, the Joint Staff was adequately staffed with experts on 
nuclear operations and nuclear system requirements. By the end of the Cold War, the 
nuclear enterprise experienced a rapid decline in mission focus, resources, experience, 
and accountability. Significant signs of decline began in 1991. Bombers and ICBMs were 
no longer on 24 hours a day and 7 days a week alert status. United States Air Force 
nuclear assets transferred from SAC to ACC. The B-1Bs converted from nuclear to 
conventional only. Finally the USAF bomber fleet and bases were reduced (United States 
Air Force 2008) . The USAF ICBM force went from six wings to three and the ICBM 
career field merged with space operations, thus diluting the nuclear experience pool even 
further. This atrophy of nuclear experts has gone beyond the missile and bomb wings. It 
has a global effect. United States European Command’s nuclear planning staff was not a 
priority and it eventually withered to unacceptable levels (Schlesinger, Carns, et al., DoD 
Nuclear Weapons Management Phase II: Review of the DoD Nuclear Mission 2008). 
Other Geographic Combatant Commanders’ nuclear planning capabilities and experts 
have essentially been non-existent as well. At Joint Staff the nuclear experts are 
becoming extinct, which is a significant disadvantage when it comes to influencing new 
nuclear deterrent capabilities, decisions regarding force structure, and participation in 
operational nuclear planning process (Schlesinger, Carns, et al., DoD Nuclear Weapons 
Managment Phase I: The AF's Nuclear Mission 2008). With the loss of the context of the 
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Cold War and the ongoing Global War on Terrorism, the resulting effect is a lack of 
nuclear experts. For example, a job requiring specific nuclear skills may have a person 
working in that billet with little to no nuclear experience. This person is not able to 
perform his or her duties and their job performance will likely impair or create 
inefficiencies in the organization (Dues 2011). As noted earlier in Chapter 1, it was a lack 
of experience that contributed the 2007 and 2008 incidents.  
Career development was one of the recommendations made to foster a culture of 
experienced nuclear personnel and to retain them. To retain nuclear experienced 
personnel, the Schlesinger Report recommended to develop a reliable and accessible 
system to track nuclear experience across the USAF (Schlesinger, Carns, et al., DoD 
Nuclear Weapons Managment Phase I: The AF's Nuclear Mission 2008). Several years 
later, after the recommendation was implemented, the Nuclear Enterprise Human Capital 
Committee was created and it is now known as the Nuclear Enterprise Action Committee 
(NEAC). Per HAF Mission Directive 1-60, the NEAC is chaired by HAF A10F (strategic 
deterrence and nuclear integration, functional authority) and in attendance are nuclear 
enterprise career functional managers, Air Force Personnel Center, MAJCOM 
representatives, HAF A1, and several other organizations. The NEAC convenes every six 
months to discuss strategy on strengthening manning and management of nuclear career 
fields (Department of the Air Force 2014). Outside of the meetings, NEAC continually 
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tracks human capital challenges, key nuclear billets, and emerging issues. It also ensures 
that all nuclear enterprise career fields remain healthy and effective. The former Chief of 
Staff for Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration (HAF A10) stated:  
We recently formalized our processes and policies for identifying, 
designating, and tracking Key Nuclear Billets (KNBs), select positions of 
responsibility within the nuclear enterprise that are vital to its health and 
sustainment. KNBs require defined levels of nuclear experience based on 
each specific position and are given the highest assignment priority. The 
program allows us to more effectively manage the assignment of qualified 
personnel to critical nuclear positions, and we rely on a periodic re-
validation process to ensure KNBs are aligned to meet the constantly 
changing needs of the enterprise. (Department of the Air Force 2014). 
 
During the Cold War years, the inspection process within the nuclear enterprise 
provided a steady reminder of how important the mission was and the special attention 
the mission attracted. The purpose of inspections are to ensure an organization and its 
people are complying with guidance, regulations, and instructions. The Independent 
Review of the DoD Nuclear Enterprise states “inspections are to contribute to the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the unit in maintaining daily readiness to perform its 
mission.” (Department of Defense 2014). As mistakes and incidents in the nuclear 
enterprise became more frequent and severe, so did the number of inspections. As a result 
inspections became the priority. After the 2007 and 2008 incidents, inspections increased 
to ensure the Airmen were following guidelines and to prevent another incident. The 
inspections increased so much that it affected leadership style, mission focus, and troops’ 
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morale. The non-stop inspections turned training exercises into opportunities for 
inspections, thus making training and inspections counterproductive (Defense Science 
Board 2011). Any misstep during the inspection was met with increasing inspection 
frequency creating a waterfall of ineffectiveness “where an already undermanned and 
under-experienced unit is over-worked, over-evaluated, over-drilled, over-observed, and 
under-trained—all at the expense of genuine proficiency and mission readiness” 
(Department of Defense 2014). The “inspection culture” became the focus for the USAF 
and adversely affected the commander’s role, responsibility, authority, and accountability 
(Department of Defense 2014). Commanders trained to the inspection and not the 
mission, for fear of failing an inspection, which meant the unit was not ready to execute 
the mission. For commanders, the possibility of getting fired hinged on the inspection 
results. The crew force, perceived scoring 100 percent on exams would increase their 
chances of promotion and broaden their career. Anything less than 100 percent meant the 
operator was not the best in his or her career field. Being pressured to score a 100 percent 
on every exam was one of the reasons why the crew force felt compelled to cheat on 
exams (Department of Defense 2014).  
In order to break the fear of being fired from inspections, the Secretary of 
Defense’s Task Force recommended that the senior leaders must convey that inspections 
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are to be used as a teaching tool to identify problems and fix them - not as an excuse to 
fire leaders (Department of Defense 2014).  
To emphasize the importance and the number of inspections conducted, the 
Independent Assessment of the Air Force Enterprise listed ten different inspections and 
staff assisted visits (SAVs). Per Air Force Instruction (AFI) 91-121, nuclear staff assisted 
visit (NSAV) program, is to assist nuclear tasked units, on a non-attribution basis, in 
maintaining its surety program. It is not an inspection and it is not intended to prepare a 
unit to pass a nuclear surety inspection (NSI); however, NSAVs somehow evolved into 
inspections, but without the formal grade (Defense Science Board 2011). The Secretary 
of Defense’s Task Force recommended that the USAF overhaul its inspection process to 
standardize it and to ensure the NSAV program was being used as intended (Schlesinger, 
Carns, et al., DoD Nuclear Weapons Managment Phase I: The AF's Nuclear Mission 
2008). 
The sheer number of inspections for both the USN and USAF was staggering. To 
illustrate how inspections became the mission the Independent Review of the DoD 
Nuclear Enterprise describes how the “inspection culture” has taken over. The missile 
maintenance unit at the Strategic Weapons Facility Pacific, Bangor had ongoing 
inspections for five consecutive weeks. The maintenance unit recorded over 100 
inspections conducted by outside agencies in within one year. The 91st Missile Wing at 
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Minot AFB had a similar experience in 2013. The missile wing had a total of 32 internal 
and external inspections within a 100 day period. During that same year a total of 293 
leadership days occurred (senior leadership visits to the missile wing), which did not 
include an additional 59 ‘visits’ to the wing, ranging from Congressional delegates 
(Department of Defense 2014). While both USN and USAF had frequent inspections the 
USAF spent significantly more time preparing for inspections, thus reinforcing the 
culture of inspections over mission.  
Table 1 illustrates the workload and impact the visits and inspections had on 
Minot AFB, which has a two nuclear wings.  
 
Table 1: Days of Special Effort at Minot AFB  
Year High Level of 
Special Effort-
Major 
Inspection, 
Congressional 
Visit 
Significant 
Level of 
Special Effort-
Major Exercise 
Higher 
Headquarter 
Visit 
Medium Level 
of Special 
Effort 
Total White 
Space 
Including 
Weekends & 
Holidays 
2008 190* 98 72 69 
2009 204 192 73 65 
2010 thru Aug 168 114 75 25 
* For all categories, there are multiple activities, sometimes three or four on many of the days. (Source: Defense 
Science Board, 2011) 
 
Inspections were so constant that the operational and logistics units did not have 
enough time nor resources to correct previous write-ups before the next round of 
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inspections. The non-stop inspections coupled with exercises had a negative impact on 
nuclear bomb wings. The nuclear bomb wings were not able to sustain the maintenance 
and inspection schedule, thus decreasing mission readiness (Department of Defense 
2014).  
 To reduce the number of inspections conducted throughout the year, a 
recommendation was made to consolidate inspections and to combine inspection teams 
(Schlesinger, Carns, et al., DoD Nuclear Weapons Management Phase II: Review of the 
DoD Nuclear Mission 2008). The inspection program needs to focus more on areas where 
issues persist (quality) and not on how many it can conduct (quantity) (Defense Science 
Board 2011). Another recommendation was to have the Joint Staff review DTRA’s 
inspections. Defense Threat Reduction agency conducts them on behalf of the Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the services. A review should be conducted to ensure 
DTRA is providing the Chairman the appropriate information and if all of the inspections 
are necessary (Department of Defense 2014). During a brief to the Senate Armed Service 
Committee in 2015, HAF A10 stated it has “initiated efforts to refine the scope and 
methodology of our nuclear inspections process, with the goal of reducing duplicative 
structures, providing wings with critical “white space” to focus on successful 
performance of the mission in lieu of constant preparation for inspections…” 
(Department of the Air Force 2015).  
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Another issue identified with inspections was that the inspection process was not 
standardized and inspectors were not appropriately trained. This led to different practices, 
lack of standardization, and unclear evaluation criteria (Schlesinger, Carns, et al., DoD 
Nuclear Weapons Managment Phase I: The AF's Nuclear Mission 2008). Both DTRA 
and Air Force Inspection Agency stated that nuclear inspections standards were not well 
understood, nor were they applied consistently amongst the major commands 
(Schlesinger, Carns, et al., DoD Nuclear Weapons Management Phase II: Review of the 
DoD Nuclear Mission 2008). With the uncertainty of what to expect during inspections, 
commanders often put a higher emphasis on them and additional resources into preparing 
for them.  
Several of the reports reviewed recommended to standardize inspections. One of 
the methods proposed to standardize was to strengthen the relationship with DTRA by 
closing gaps in NSI methodology (Schlesinger, Carns, et al., DoD Nuclear Weapons 
Management Phase II: Review of the DoD Nuclear Mission 2008). An update to this 
recommendation is that the AFGSC continually improves and implements its Air Force 
Inspection System (AFIS) and integrates inspections with that system (Department of the 
Air Force 2015). The AFIS “relies on inspections by the Inspector General (IG) and 
assessments and evaluations by functional area managers to ensure that all wings comply 
with Air Force Standards…” (Camm, et al. 2013).  
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Another issue within the nuclear enterprise culture is the Personnel Reliability 
Program (PRP). The PRP is the commander’s program that identifies reliability of personnel 
performing nuclear related duties. According to DoD’s regulation 5210.42 and Air Force 
Manual 10-3902, the purpose of PRP is “to ensure that each person selected and retained for 
performing duties associated with nuclear weapons or nuclear command and control systems 
and equipment is emotionally stable and physically capable, and has demonstrated reliability 
and professional capability.” (Department of Air Force 2010). Since PRP involves nuclear 
personnel and duties, it gets inspected. Inspectors focused intensely on reviewing PRP 
medical records (Department of Defense 2014). The pressure of ensuring the records are 
perfect with limited resources puts an unnecessary strain on the medical community 
(Department of Defense 2014). For instance, a Competent Medical Authority (CMA) 
supports several different geographically separated nuclear activities. The CMA verbally 
established a policy to accomplish an end-to-end record review of each newly assigned 
individual, even if the individual was PRP certified at their previous assignment. With only 
one CMA conducting the reviews, the individual’s PRP status could be delayed by several 
weeks. The amount of time the individual is not PRP certified is time he or she cannot 
accomplish their nuclear related duties, which puts the burden on the unit. To add to this 
tedious process, the CMA must place a cover sheet on the outside of the medical folder 
annotating any past issues found, no matter how far in the past. This extra precaution is taken 
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to avoid criticism by the inspector, but that is not the intent or a requirement in the DoD and 
Air Force PRP directive (Department of Defense 2014).  
With the onslaught of inspections, additional informal PRP practices developed over 
time, complicating and rendering the program burdensome. This ultimately has a negative 
impact on the nuclear qualified personnel available to complete the mission. For example, a 
unit may be manned at 80 percent. When individuals are seen by an off-base facility they are 
automatically suspended from nuclear duties regardless of the type of appointment. After the 
appointment is completed, the individuals must be seen by on-base medical personnel. The 
individual will be evaluated by the medical team to determine if he or she will remain 
suspended or be reinstated for duty. Cumulatively, the individuals who are PRP suspended 
could account for 10 percent of unit manning (for a unit which is already undermanned). For 
example, security forces and maintenance will have to work extended hours to cover the 
missed shifts. This approach does not meet DoD guidance, because automatic suspension 
should not occur. The automatic suspension is a result of zero-risk practice in the USAF 
(Defense Science Board 2011). The zero-risk approach develops a culture of distrust, and 
creates unnecessary work for medical staff, inspectors, and the unit.  
Several reports recommended that the Secretary of the Air Force (SECAF), Chief 
of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF), and commanders at all levels need to provide clear 
guidance for the PRP. They must emphasize PRP is a commander’s program used to 
ensure individuals are reliable, safe, and capable of accomplishing the mission (Defense 
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Science Board 2011). In 2014, the PRP changed to put more trust back in leadership. The 
process has been simplified and the individual no longer needs to see the CMA. The 
individual still needs to notify the appropriate personnel for off-base appointments, but 
now the commanding officer has the flexibility to ask the appropriate questions to 
determine if the individual is fit for duty (Mayfield 2014). This puts the trust back into 
the commander.  
To help reduce manpower in the clinics and eradicate an overly bureaucratic program 
it was recommended to eliminate the automatic suspension for off-base visits (Department of 
Defense 2014). To accomplish this, a recommendation was made to change the PRP re-
certification process. The look-back period should be limited to the last certification unless 
there is a specific reason for the CMA to look back further (Defense Science Board 2011). 
Another recommendation was to keep the individual PRP certified if they were PRP certified 
at their previous assignment. This recommendation benefits the gaining unit because the 
amount of time the individual is not available for duty is drastically reduced. The Air Force 
PRP manual was re-written in 2014 to implement these recommendations; however, the 
practice of automatic suspension still exists, because some commanders have always done it 
that way (Department of Defense 2014).  
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Organization  
 During the Cold War, SAC was the sole command which responsible for all 
ICBMs and nuclear capable bombers. Strategic Air Command’s mission was to deter 
nuclear conflict by providing a capable and credible nuclear force (Schlesinger, Carns, et 
al., DoD Nuclear Weapons Managment Phase I: The AF's Nuclear Mission 2008). When 
SAC dissolved in 1992, there was no single organization in the USAF who owned the 
nuclear mission. Nuclear bombers were under ACC and ICBMs were under AFSPC. 
Readiness, performance, and inspections varied between the two MAJCOMs. This ‘new’ 
structure was not optimized to provide a credible nuclear deterrent. The commitment 
needed to sustain the USAF nuclear enterprise decayed in vitality, readiness, and 
resources (Schlesinger, Carns, et al., DoD Nuclear Weapons Managment Phase I: The 
AF's Nuclear Mission 2008).  
Several reform reports recommended that one single organization in the USAF 
needs to own the nuclear mission. This single organization would also be responsible for 
providing nuclear forces to the combatant commanders. This single command would 
create a synergistic effort for the USAF. The recommendation was taken to heart and in 
2009, AFGSC was activated and inherited all USAF responsibilities related to nuclear 
operations. The newly established MAJCOM would streamline the USAF’s nuclear 
enterprise to train, organize, and equip the nuclear bomber and ICBM forces. In addition 
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to streamlining the nuclear forces, AFGSC provides a clear chain of command for all 
USAF nuclear units (Air Force Global Strike Command 2016). Initially the AFGSC 
commander was a three star general. This posed a problem since the majority of other 
MAJCOM commanders were four star generals. This difference in rank was identified as 
an issue. In DoD’s nuclear enterprise review, it was recommended that the AFGSC 
commander should be a four-star general (Department of Defense 2014). This 
recommendation would benefit the nuclear enterprise because it reinforces the 
importance and priority of the nuclear mission (U.S. Air Force 2014). In 2015, the 
command billet for AFGSC was changed to a four-star.  
Resource limitation was an issue in the nuclear enterprise. For example, Eighth 
Air Force, a NAF, was ineptly manned to support the global strike missions. Under ACC 
in 1992, responsibilities of the Eighth Air Force included long-range nuclear and 
conventional capable bombers, Air Force intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
airframes, Air Force Cyber Command, and intelligence organizations. Now under 
AFGSC, Eighth Air Force retains the long-range bomber assets while ACC retains 
control of the other airframes and organizations (Schlesinger, Carns, et al., DoD Nuclear 
Weapons Managment Phase I: The AF's Nuclear Mission 2008). Air Force Space 
Command also had its challenges within the ICBM crew force. The demand for entry-
level officers at the missile wings was high; however, the demand for mid-level officers 
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was low. That equates to after a four year tour, the missile operators could not remain in 
their current career field, so they went to space operations. Once the missile operator 
went to space operations it was rare for them to return back to the missile operations. 
Space operations was expanding and there were more career and promotion 
opportunities. As a pure missile operator, promotion and career broadening opportunities 
were limited (Schlesinger, Carns, et al., DoD Nuclear Weapons Managment Phase I: The 
AF's Nuclear Mission 2008). The loss of skilled nuclear missile operators eventually left 
a shortfall in mid and senior level positions. 
It was recommended that the USAF establish a new organization that oversees 
nuclear issues and manages nuclear leaders. In 2008, HAF A10 was established to 
provide the necessary focus for the USAF’s nuclear enterprise. Headquarters Air Force 
A10 directly reports to the CSAF and is responsible for policy oversight and integration 
of all USAF nuclear enterprise activity and issues (Center for Strategic and International 
Studies 2008). One of the other responsibilities HAF A10 has is validating, adjudicating, 
approving, and publishing the KNB list (see HAFMD 1-60 for additional 
responsibilities). 
Another organizational issue that burdens the nuclear enterprise is the limited 
resources they have to execute the nuclear mission. Plagued with budget cuts and 
sequestration, it is difficult to keep units fully manned to sustainable operations. For 
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example, one bomb wing reported its crew chief manning was at 67 percent of its 
allocated positions, which means there are not enough crew chiefs to support the training 
missions (Schlesinger, Carns, et al., DoD Nuclear Weapons Managment Phase I: The 
AF's Nuclear Mission 2008). The result of the shortfall was that approximately 20 
percent of the training sorties were not flown, thus limiting aircrew proficiency and 
ultimately reducing combat readiness (Schlesinger, Carns, et al., DoD Nuclear Weapons 
Managment Phase I: The AF's Nuclear Mission 2008). Another resource limitation is 
finding parts for the aging nuclear systems. The average age for the ICBM is 
approximately 41 years, 50 years for the B-52, 14 years for the B-2, and 28 years for the 
Ohio-class submarine (Spring 2011). Finding parts to fix these systems is becoming 
nearly impossible, because the systems have out lasted the suppliers.  
To help solve the manning issue, recommendations were made for HAF A1 to 
define nuclear-critical billets and identify critical nuclear positions as “must fill” on the 
unit manning documents (Schlesinger, Carns, et al., DoD Nuclear Weapons Managment 
Phase I: The AF's Nuclear Mission 2008). This recommendation was implemented and it 
is now the responsibility of HAF A10, as previously discussed. Another manning 
recommendation made in the Schlesinger report was simply to end strength drawdowns 
of the nuclear force. Currently house lawmakers are advocating to add over 20,000 more 
troops to the military force. The bill has made it to the first draft of the annual defense 
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authorization bill and looks promising (Shane III 2016). To help sustain the triad fleet 
and its components, the supporting equipment should be identified, correctly inventoried, 
and sustained until the end of life of the weapon system (Department of Defense 2014). It 
was recommended that the part supply process should develop a proactive supply and 
contract management systems for out-of-production parts (Department of Defense 2014). 
To help remedy the shortage of supplies, the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) 
demonstrated its commitment to the nuclear mission by signing a memorandum of 
agreement with U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). Defense Logistics Agency 
has a dedicated weapon system program manager and a weapon system support manager, 
which basically help manage the supply chain for the nuclear triad (Moore 2015). 
Training  
 With the emphasis on the conventional mission, nuclear training and education 
has diminished. The lack of training is more noticeable at the units that have dual-capable 
aircraft (Schlesinger, Carns, et al., DoD Nuclear Weapons Managment Phase I: The AF's 
Nuclear Mission 2008). Also nuclear training events at formal training courses were 
reduced in order to increase conventional training (U.S. Air Force Nuclear Task Force 
2008). For example, at the B-52 formal training unit their syllabus for new B-52 crew 
members only included one flight simulator and a sortie devoted to the nuclear mission.  
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The Independent Review of the DoD Nuclear Enterprise recommended that senior 
leaders review the importance of conventional and nuclear missions and adjust priority as 
needed (Department of Defense 2014). The review was accomplished and the DoD 
decided to consolidate and integrate five guidance documents into one strategic directive 
called Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF). The GEF provides commanders the 
guidance for security cooperation, contingency planning, global posture, global force 
management, and nuclear weapon planning (Sweeney 2015). The GEF also allows the 
SECDEF and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to use the assigned forces 
in support of combatant commanders to accomplish the mission and to allocate forces 
(Air Force Global Strike Command 2014). 
If additional training opportunities are added, leaders must ensure it is quality 
training. In the Welch and Harvey Report, Sailors and Airmen were interviewed and 
asked about the quality of initial training they received. Nearly all of them stated it felt 
like the training units are focused on throughput and not on quality (Department of 
Defense 2014). Nuclear technicians must complete 3-12 months of training and 
certification before they can actually assist with nuclear operations in their units. 
Personnel assigned on a four year tour can potentially wait up to 20 months before 
entering training because of the lack of instructors, aging equipment, and facility 
limitations. All of these factors cause a training backlog (Department of Defense 2014). 
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A recommendation suggested the USN and USAF should require a hands-on 
demonstration of skills and incorporate heavy computer-based training and evaluations 
before graduating to mitigate the hasty throughput and to emphasize quality (Department 
of Defense 2014).   
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III. Data Collection and Methodology  
“To know your future you must know the past.” 
-George Santayana  
Chapter Overview 
To analyze and synthesize the reports, a mixed method approach using a case 
study and critical success factors (CSFs) are used. While conducting the case study, it 
was clear in some of the reports that the recommendations were separated into four 
categories: leadership, culture, organization, and training. For some of the other reports 
where it was not as clear, key words were used to help categorize the recommendations. 
Within the categories the recommendations are analyzed even further for similarities to 
start consolidating like recommendations. This decreased the overall number of 
recommendations. Once the recommendation was verified, the CSF methodology was 
applied to its implementation. The CSF is part of a five step process that is necessary to 
successfully achieve objectives within an organization. Once the implementation is 
successful, key performance indicators (KPIs) should be used to continually assess the 
objectives being measured.  
Data Collection 
Data collected for this research began with searching for nuclear reform 
recommendations. Initially peer-reviewed articles, Congressional hearings, and reports 
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from the entire nuclear enterprise were being collected to find recommendations and 
programs implemented. Over one hundred documents were accumulated. These were 
narrowed and the focus shifted to the DoD nuclear enterprise reports from 2008 to 2014. 
Each report was studied for trends in issues and recommendations. In the nuclear 
enterprise and written in an outline format. The recommendations were then transcribed 
to an excel spreadsheet for further analysis. As for the articles and hearing transcripts 
collected, they were referenced to gather additional information on recommendations. 
They were used to validate and update the implementations. Additional assistance and 
information was gathered from Headquarters Air Force (HAF) A10, Office of the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense, OSD CAPE, and Air Force Global Strike Command 
(AFGSC).  
Case Study 
 A case study is “qualitative research in which in-depth data are gathered relative 
to a single individual, program, or event for the purpose of learning more about an 
unknown or poorly understood situation” for a defined period of time (Leedy and Ormrod 
2013). The reports published from 2008 to 2014 were in response to the 2007 and 2008 
incidents. These reports contain the most current nuclear reform issues and 
recommendations published. The reports were analyzed to understand what the key issues 
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were, what recommendations were made, and which recommendations were 
implemented.  
  The data for this paper was broad in terms of the number and types of 
recommendations, so a ‘sifting’ approach was used. Most of the report recommendations 
were entered, excluding unit level and below recommendations since they are not in the 
scope of this research, into a spreadsheet. The process to categorize the recommendations 
occurred as the recommendations were entered into the spreadsheet. Leadership, culture, 
organization, and training are the categories the recommendations were grouped into. 
Categories 
To organize the recommendations into the following categories, several key words 
were identified using the reform reports.  
1. Leadership: 
a. Key words: leaders, leadership, communicate, commitment, leadership 
development, and commanders empower 
2. Culture: 
a. Key words: culture, inspection, officer or enlisted career development, 
trust, zero-defect, perfection, and personal reliability program 
3. Organization: 
a. Key words: organization, resources, personnel, equipment, organizational 
change, need for an organization, key nuclear billets, must-fill nuclear 
positions, and critical nuclear positions 
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4. Training: 
a. Key words: training, education, professional military education, quality 
training, robust training, and focus on mission 
A comparison of the data was then accomplished to determine which recommendations 
were the most common amongst the reports. Another spreadsheet was developed and it 
was further divided from categories into subcategories. For example, leadership (L) was 
further defined as leadership commitment (L1), leadership development (L2) and so on 
(Appendix G). Some recommendations did not ‘naturally’ fall into one of the four 
categories, so some interpretation was necessary. Meanwhile, other recommendations fell 
into more than one category, so they were placed in all applicable categories.  
An additional search was necessary to validate the implementation is still current. 
If the recommendation was not implemented then it was removed from the category. The 
remaining implemented recommendations were then checked for validity and updates. 
The last ‘sift’ to narrow the scope, was the implementation had to impact the wing level 
and above. Implementations at the unit level were not reviewed, because they were 
outside the scope of the paper.  
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Figure 1: Research Paper Recommendation Selection Process 
Critical Success Factors 
According to Bullen and Rockart, critical success factors (CSFs) are “the limited 
number of areas in which satisfactory results will ensure successful competitive 
performance for the individual, department or organization. Critical success factors are 
the few key areas where ‘things must go right’ for the business to flourish and for the 
manager’s goals to be attained.” (Bullen and Rockart 1981). Another way to explain this 
statement is that CSFs describe areas in which an organization must perform extremely 
well in order to succeed. Critical success factor is the chosen method used to help answer 
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the problem statement. Applying the CSFs will “validate and ensure alignment with the 
direction and intent of the organization can enhance any decision, initiative, effort, or 
process.” (Caralli 2004).  
Bullen and Rockart introduced a two-phased interview-method that begins with 
an executive’s goals and the underlying CSFs, followed by developing CSF measures. 
Rich Caralli, former Carnegie Mellon University instructor, suggested a five-step process 
in addition to the two-phased method (Caralli 2004). In Caralli’s five-step method, the 
first three steps are integral, because they contribute to the organization’s mission and 
objectives. The mission is the overarching vision of the organization. The objectives 
support the mission with smaller attainable goals. The first step in the process is to define 
the objectives. If the objectives are not already established, then they are developed from 
interviews with the senior leaders who can influence or help develop the goals and 
objectives (Gates 2010). As the interviews are being conducted documents and 
questionnaires are being reviewed at the same time. To elaborate more, the document 
review can include performance metrics, organizations’ short-term or long-term plan, 
Define 
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Analyze 
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Analyze 
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 Figure 2: Caralli's Five-Step CSF Method; Source Caralli, 2004 
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existing CSFs, or CSFs of peer organizations (Caralli 2004). The purpose of the third step 
is to “categorize and analyze the raw data so it can be used to derive CSFs.” (Caralli 
2004). One way to analyze the data is to create activity statements from interviews and 
document reviews. The activity statements reflect the senior leader’s understanding of 
what needs to occur for success. Once the activity statements are defined the supporting 
themes are developed, which becomes the foundation for CSFs. At this point of the 
process the previous three steps materialize into CSFs. The CSFs are kept short and 
concise, otherwise they will lose their meaning and focus (Caralli 2004). The purpose of 
CSFs is to pinpoint the activities that are the most important to senior leaders in order to 
achieve the mission. Also when deriving CSFs see if two or more can be combined. This 
will add more detail and it will reduce the number of CSFs. If there are too many CSFs, 
then it becomes difficult to track or focus on what really matters. Finally, the last step in 
the process is to analyze CSFs. Since the CSFs are a key element in the success of the 
organization, this step is crucial. To ensure the CSFs are correctly identified, they are 
compared to the organization’s initiatives using affinity analysis. Affinity analysis is a 
method used to study the similarities between two items to understand the relationships 
and draw conclusions (Caralli 2004). This analysis is the reason why CSFs are so 
powerful.  
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Figure 3: Affinity Analysis Example; Source Caralli, 2004 
Referencing Figure 3, the enterprise departments determine if they contribute to the 
CSFs. Identifying these relationships provides the departments a starting point to define 
their goals in support of the CSFs (Caralli 2004). 
Critical success factors are the foundation and structure that an organization must 
accomplish well to be successful. Once the CSFs have been determined, an organization 
must know how it is performing in relation to those factors. This is accomplished by 
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using CSFs to develop key performance indicators (KPIs). Key performance indicators 
are metrics, both quantitative and qualitative, which illustrate how well an organization is 
performing against CSFs (Stapenhurst 2009). There are two levels of KPIs: strategic and 
operational. Strategic KPIs are measurements that use a top down approach and 
operational KPIs use a bottom up approach. For this research paper the strategic level is 
used. 
 
Figure 4: KPI Development; Source Lorette, 2016 
There are five steps in developing KPIs (see Figure 4). The first step in the KPI 
process is to reference the organization’s mission. The mission will set the expectation 
for success and lay the foundation to develop KPIs. Next, establish the metrics the 
organization will need to successfully accomplish the mission. These metrics need to be 
specific and applicable to the mission. An example is to reduce the number of ground 
vehicle safety accidents by 10 percent. The third step is to establish a data point to 
compare progress. The data point is necessary to develop the indicators for future 
accomplishments because it uses the data that already occurred or is occurring (Lorette 
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2016). Now that the appropriate measure is established, the KPI’s percentage of change 
can be determined in each area. At this point, only look at the current numbers and not 
the future numbers. Then compare the numbers on different scales, i.e. from the previous 
year(s) or previous month(s). Lastly, set the frequency to review the KPIs. Each area will 
need to set their own frequency as the requirements will be different. This last step is 
critical, as it contributes to the success of the organization and it ensure the KPIs are 
updated as necessary.  
 
 
Figure 5: Critical Success Factor Hierarchy 
Surveys 
A survey is a tool used to collect data from a group or individuals (Alessi and 
Martin 2010). The purpose of using a survey for this paper is to gain the insights of senior 
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leaders and to assess if they identified certain reform efforts as successful or failures. The 
survey questions were based on the recommendations that were implemented and still 
operational. To evaluate validity and relevancy, a survey pre-test was completed before 
the survey went to the participants (Presser, et al. 2004). The pre-test consisted of sending 
the survey to peers with nuclear experience. The Likert scale was used for the 
participant’s responses. The Likert scale was developed in 1932 for measuring attitudes 
of participants in a series of statements or questions, thus “tapping into their cognitive 
and affective components of attitudes.” (McLeod 2008). The Likert scale is based on a 
five point continuum: strongly agree (2pts), agree (1pt), disagree (-1pt), strongly disagree 
(-2pts), and unknown (0pts) (McLeod 2008).  
The survey assessed the senior leaders’ (O-5 to O-10 and civilian equivalents) 
perception in each of the armed services to see if there was a consensus that can be 
considered a standard. The surveys are completely voluntary and anonymous. The data 
will be compared with AFGSC’s FIP interview results to validate the perceptions of 
nuclear reform recommendations.   
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IV. Analysis and Results  
“The optimist thinks this is the best of all possible worlds. The pessimist fears it is 
true.”  
-J. Robert Oppenheimer 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter will step through the process from identifying an issue to 
implementing KPIs. First, it will step through how the decision is made to implement a 
recommendation. Then the five step process of CSFs and KPIs is discussed in detail 
using the stand up of AFGSC. Air Force Global Strike command is used as an example, 
because there is enough unclassified data to use for this explanation. The second half of 
this chapter will discuss the results of this research paper’s survey. As this chapter steps 
through the process, the investigative questions in Chapter 1 will be answered. As a 
review the investigative questions are listed here:  
1) What process is used to get a recommendation implemented? 
2) How does the nuclear enterprise define success? 
3) How are implementations assessed once they are sustained?  
Decision Making Process: (Investigative Question 1) 
Following the 2006 classified component shipment to Taiwan and the 2007 
unauthorized movement of nuclear warheads, the SECDEF requested James Schlesinger, 
to lead a task force to conduct an assessment on the USAF’s nuclear mission 
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(Schlesinger, Carns, et al., DoD Nuclear Weapons Managment Phase I: The AF's Nuclear 
Mission 2008). In 2008, Schlesinger’s report was released and one of the significant 
issues identified was a “lack of unity of command,” because there was no single 
MAJCOM in the USAF that had ‘ownership’ of the nuclear mission (Schlesinger, Carns, 
et al., DoD Nuclear Weapons Managment Phase I: The AF's Nuclear Mission 2008). At 
this point two MAJCOMs, ACC and AFSPC, owned the nuclear mission; however, it was 
not their primary focus. Schlesinger’s Task Force made several recommendations from 
this observation, but the one that stood out was a need for a single MAJCOM to own the 
USAF’s nuclear mission.  
Schlesinger’s Task Force then recommended a designation of AFSPC to Air 
Force Strategic Command (AFSTRAT). The mission of AFSTRAT would be aligned 
with the mission of USSTRATCOM and AFSTRAT would provide clear lines of 
authority and accountability (Schlesinger, Carns, et al., DoD Nuclear Weapons 
Managment Phase I: The AF's Nuclear Mission 2008). Air Force Strategic Command 
never happened, but the takeaway from the recommendation was the need for one 
organization to oversee the nuclear mission. In response to the report’s recommendation, 
two conferences were convened with senior leaders in attendance (Bleil 2009). The first 
meeting, a nuclear summit, was assembled a few days after Schlesinger’s Report was 
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released. Less than a month later, at the 2008 CORONA Conference, USAF’s top 
generals approved the recommendation for a new MAJCOM (U.S Air Force 2008).  
The mission of this new MAJCOM, now known as AFGSC, is to focus on the 
nuclear and global strike mission. In the Roadmap for a New Command: Lessons from 
Strategic Air Command and Air Combat Command, the author had an interview with 
HAF A10 and quoted him stating “We didn’t all agree on how we would quantify that 
sense of urgency; but I think the Chief and the Secretary [of the Air Force], by everyone 
of their actions - gave a clear indication of where nuclear stood. And that helped 
normalize everyone having a common view of the sense of urgency.” (Bleil 2009). The 
official announcement for AFGSC was made in October 2008 and it was also released in 
Air Force’s nuclear roadmap titled Reinvigorating the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise. The 
roadmap mentions the USAF considered several other alternatives to reinvigorate the 
nuclear enterprise, but the stand up of AFGSC was ultimately chosen with the goal to 
“increase nuclear mission focus, by placing all ICBMs and nuclear-capable bombers into 
a single command.” (U.S. Air Force Nuclear Task Force 2008). On January 12, 2009 the 
USAF officially established AFGSC Provisional (P) at Bolling Air Force Base, 
Washington D.C. Air Force Global Strike Provisional had the responsibility to implement 
the SECAF’s Program Action Directive (PAD) and the Programming Plan (PPLAN).  
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Critical Success Factor Method 
 
Figure 6: Caralli's Five-Step CSF Method; Source Caralli, 2004 
 Once AFGSC (P) became operational, the staff could start defining their scope by 
using the PAD and PPLAN. According to AFI 10-501 the PAD is “a HAF document that 
provides strategic level guidance to HAF staff and MAJCOM commanders about how to 
achieve SECAF’s and CSAF’s directed objectives.” (United States Air Force 2015). The 
PAD requires detailed cross-MAJCOM planning and guidance to implement USAF 
programs (United States Air Force 2015). The PAD also has a broad scope that affects 
several organizations and consists of a basic plan and functional staff annexes, which 
provides the staff with specific guidance (United States Air Force 2015). Before the PAD 
is developed, data is collected and analyzed by the staff. Some of the data points are 
turned into action items. If the action items are critical to the success of AFGSC, these 
would be further refined as CSFs. Once the CSFs have been determined they will be 
analyzed. This is crucial for the success of AFGSC. The analysis involves comparing the 
CSFs to the PAD’s objectives. If the CSFs do not encompass the objectives then the 
probability of success is decreased (Caralli 2004).  
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The PPLAN is a detailed planning document used to implement the PAD. It is 
written below the HAF level and it is used to initiate and record major actions (United 
States Air Force 2015). The purpose of the PPLAN is to “define required actions and 
outlines the responsibilities for achieving a given program directive.” and to activate or 
deactivate a unit (United States Air Force 2015). See Figure 7 for an example of an action 
item in AFGSC’s PPLAN. 
 
Figure 7: PPLAN Action Item Example; Source AFGSC Programming Plan 09-01 
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Program Action Directive (PAD) 
The PAD defines the mission statement and responsibilities. These 
responsibilities are broad enough to allow flexibility to execute the mission. The PAD 
also provides the guidance of how AFGSC will be implemented. Some examples of what 
the guidance provides are: how and which assets will be transferred from ACC and 
AFSPC to AFGSC, how AFGSC will organize its NAFs, which bases will be assigned to 
AFGSC, and what personnel will be allocated to support AFGSC. To ensure the stand up 
of AFGSC stays on schedule a milestone chart is provided in the PAD. This chart 
includes the action, the office who is responsible for it, the due date, and when the action 
was completed. The actions on this chart are considered CSFs, since they have to be 
completed before AFGSC is fully operational. These required actions are then separated 
by staff functions, both Air Staff and Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, to ensure each 
function knows its responsibility. The required actions also provide the supporting 
MAJCOMs guidance of how they will support AFGSC. Lastly, the PAD has an annex 
and appendixes that provides additional direction and specific guidance to help support 
the stand up of AFGSC.  
Surveys 
  The purpose of the following surveys was to get an insight from senior leaders 
and Airmen at operational units. Two surveys were used for this research. The first 
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survey, conducted in July 2016, references the issues and recommendations identified in 
chapter two. The second survey was accomplished in 2014 by AFGSC FIP Survey 
Analysis team.  
Some of the survey questions were separated into two rank structures, O-5 to O-6 
and O-7 to O-10. The purpose of separating the ranks was to get feedback on squadron, 
group, and wing level leadership (O-5 to O-6) and for senior leaders at NAF, MAJCOM, 
and Air Staff (O-7 to O-10). 
Survey 1: (Investigative Question 2) 
Twenty surveys were sent out and 11 were completed for a 55 percent response 
rate. A total of twenty-six questions were asked to all of the participants. See Table 2 for 
demographics of the participants.  
Table 2: Survey 1 Demographics 
   RANK Total Years in Nuclear Enterprise 
 USAF USN 
O-5 to O-6 
or 
equivalent 
O-7 to 
O-10 5-10 10-15 15-20 Over 20 
% 90.9% 9.1% 27.3% 72.7%   18.2%  9.1% 9.1%  63.6%  
 
The questions that reference the ranks of O-5 to O-10 have four bars displayed. 
The blue bars represent O-5 to O-6 and the yellow bars represent O-7 to O-10. The 
numbers in the graphs represent a scale from -2 to +2. The closer the responses are to +2, 
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the more likely they agree with the question. The closer the responses are to -2, the more 
likely they disagree with the question.  
 
Strongly Agree = +2 
Agree = +1 
Neutral = 0 
Disagree = -1 
Strongly Disagree = -2 
 
The survey was divided into the four categories pre-identified by the reform 
reports: leadership, culture, organization, and training. Figure 8 displays the number of 
questions asked in each category. Thirty-five percent of the survey questions were 
focused on leadership, since this category was identified as a significant factor that led to 
the erosion of the nuclear enterprise.  
35% (9)
31% (8)
15% (4)
19% (5)
Number of Questions per Category
Leadership Culture
Organization Training
Figure 8: Ratio of Survey Questions 
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Leadership 
 
Figure 9: Leadership Question 7&8 
Leadership was doing a modest job of communicating the importance of the 
nuclear mission. This lack of communication eventually affected the morale of the troops 
supporting the nuclear enterprise. One of the common recommendations for this issue 
was for leaders to effectively communicate the message. Figure 9 asks how effective the 
communication is in the USAF and the USN. The results show the USN is more effective 
at communicating than the USAF. The following comments from the survey may help 
explain why. 
-“Then Navy clearly speaks with one voice and the CNO [Chief of 
Naval Operations] has publically stated the foundational nature of 
their deterrent force.”  
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-“Outside of a small cadre of leaders directly involved in the 
nuclear enterprise, USAF leaders tend to ignore this mission set. 
My sense is that USN leaders are better at this than the USAF.”  
 
-“In general, there has been an improvement in senior USAF 
leaders discussing the importance of the nuclear mission, but it is 
intermittent.” 
 
To elaborate more on the first comment, the USN has a Strategic Systems 
Program (SSP) which only has the nuclear mission. The Director of SSP is 
responsible for all of USN’s nuclear weapons and associated systems, with no 
conventional systems. The single mission may contribute to why the USN 
communicates more effectively about the nuclear mission.  
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Figure 10: Leadership Question 9&10 
Another concern identified by the reform reports, is the lack of nuclear 
experienced leaders. Several initiatives to educate and train were implemented to help 
leaders increase their nuclear experience and knowledge. The results in Figure 10 show 
that the flag officers in the USN are perceived to be more experienced than USAF. One 
of the comments from the survey states: “The experience we [assumption is USAF] have 
is good but we don't have a deep base - very thin.” (Survey conducted by author 2016). A 
retired Naval Surface Warfare Senior Chief states the USN keeps their nuclear officers 
and enlisted in the nuclear realm, so they can become steeped with nuclear experience 
(Navy Nukes 2014). For example, the current Director of SSP (Vice Admiral Benedict) 
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has completed nine tours within SSP and is very knowledgeable of the USN’s nuclear 
enterprise (United States Navy 2015).  
 
Figure 11: Leadership Question 13&14 
Many leaders stopped making risky decisions for the fear of making a mistake 
and getting fired. The perception of leaders getting fired for failing an inspection promted 
a risk-averse culture. The Creedon-Fanta Report recommended to stop firing leaders for 
minor mistakes or errors (Department of Defense 2014). A comment on the survey states: 
“Each sub-culture in each of the services handles risk differently. For example in the 
nuclear enterprise the bomber culture manages risk and is NOT averse, while the ICBM 
community is risk-averse.” (Survey conducted by author 2016). 
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The survey participants believe USAF’s O-5s and O-6s are still risk-averse. There 
is a lingering mindset or culture that still resonates in the USAF nuclear mission. The 
culture is difficult to change and it takes time. When the next generation of USAF leaders 
take command, we may see less risk-averse leaders, because they didn’t ‘live’ through 
the previous culture.  
 
Figure 12: Leadership Question 15 
The unit’s mission and priority morphed into training for inspections. As the 
number of inspections increased, more emphasis was placed on them. To change the 
inspection culture, it was recommended to reduce the number of inspections by 
consolidating them. In Figure 12, all of the participants provided their input for both the 
USAF and the USN. The majority of the participants did not agree that the leaders train 
to inspections. A comment from the survey states: “If the inspections focus on the 
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mission, ‘training for the inspection’ does not occur in lieu of the mission. The issue here 
is how closely does the inspection measure mission accomplishment? In the past the 
Navy did a better job here. Inspection changes post 2014 have addressed this issue.” 
(Survey conducted by author 2016).  
Culture 
The onslaught of inspections had several side-effects, one of them being the zero-
defect culture. After the recommendation was made to communicate that leaders will not 
get fired for mistakes or errors on inspections, senior leaders communicated that same 
message to the nuclear leaders. The survey participants agreed the communication is 
effective. Here are two comments from the survey: 
- “Inspections are not used for punishments, but of course a failing 
grade is an indicator the unit leader isn't where he or she should be. 
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it is natural that senior leaders may take action that subordinates 
might interpret as punishment.” 
 
-“Inspections are compliance based for NSIs [Nuclear Surety 
Inspections] . . . UEIs [Unit Effectiveness Inspections] to a degree 
assess compliance but are absolutely what we need.” 
Figure 13 shows that inspections are no longer being used for promotion or 
punishment. Leaders utilize inspections to help identify gaps in their nuclear program(s). 
Leadership would often make a statement, but there was no action behind it. This 
“say-do gap” is an issue in the nuclear enterprise. In Reinvigorating the Air Force 
Nuclear Enterprise, it states “in accordance with the Air Force number one priority to 
revitalize the Air Force nuclear enterprise, the Annual Planning and Programming 
Guidance (APPG) will reflect minimal risk to the Air Force nuclear enterprise during the 
POM [Program Objective Memoranda] process.” (U.S. Air Force Nuclear Task Force 
2008). The USAF has stated the nuclear mission is its priority, but the Schlesinger Report 
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revealed many Airmen heard the same repeated statement that the nuclear mission is 
“number one”; however, many of them were skeptical of it (Schlesinger, Carns, et al., 
DoD Nuclear Weapons Managment Phase I: The AF's Nuclear Mission 2008). 
 
Figure 14: Culture Question 22 
Figure 14 illustrates that the majority of the survey participants agree that the USN 
adheres to its words by making the nuclear mission its focus. On the other hand, the 
USAF still lacks the focus on the nuclear mission, but it has improved in the past five 
years. One of the recommendations made by the Welch-Harvey Report was to put action 
behind the words (Department of Defense 2014). One of the comments from the survey 
expands on this recommendation. “This culture was not present in the USN. Nuclear was 
a priority. In the AF, this situation has improved but nuclear is still not the first priority. 
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In addition, after the SECAF James and Deputy Secretary of Defense Work leave we will 
likely lose significant ground here.” (Survey conducted by author 2016). In the past 
several years, SECAF has diminished the “say-do gap”. For example, SECAF has visited 
every nuclear base, advocated for an increase in the nuclear budget, supported nuclear 
weapon system upgrades, and has emphasized the importance of the nuclear mission.  
Training 
For Figure 15 and 16, high-level civilians are defined as O-5 to O-10 equivalents 
and entry to mid-level civilians are O-4 and below equivalents. The survey participants 
rated each rank structure in both the USAF and USN. 
 
Figure 15: Training Question 28 
 
Figure 15 illustrates the opportunities for USAF O-4s to O-6s have increased, but 
the outlook for the other ranks look rather bleak. One of the suggestions made on the 
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survey is: “Courses like Nuclear 100, 200, 300 & 400 are good but insufficient. We need 
additional education courses and need to cover a broader section of the AF [and Navy] 
(esp civilians)” (Survey conducted by author, 2016).
 
Figure 16: Training Question 29 
The results displayed in Figure 16 shows the USN is doing slightly better than the USAF. 
To help close the service gap, a suggestion made by one of the participants is to 
communicate the courses available to all MAJCOMs and services.  
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Figure 17: Training Question 31 
The majority of the participants agree that the USN has not lost focus on the 
nuclear mission. One of the reasons why the USN can focus on the nuclear mission is the 
SSP, which was mentioned earlier. However, USAF has dual-capable units (B-52, B-2, 
F-15, and F-16) that still train for both nuclear and conventional missions. A participant 
made an observation stating: “…Tanker training for nuclear mission needs more 
emphasis…Nuclear training in the AF is not where it should be, but focus on nuclear 
training in the AF is improving.” (Survey conducted by author, 2016).  
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Figure 18: Training Question 32 
Question 32, Figure 18, differs from the other survey questions. Since the 
response selection is ‘yes’, ‘no’, ‘no, but it has improved in the past 3-5 years’, and 
‘undecided’ the scale is 1 to 6 compared to the -2 to +2 of the other survey questions. The 
number represents the number of votes each response received. For example, there are 
four participants who selected yes, training has improved, for the USAF. The response 
‘no, but it has improved in the past 3-5 years’, was included to show improvement in the 
nuclear enterprise. The majority of responses for the USN is undecided, since the 
majority of the participants are in the USAF. For the USAF, a split between ‘yes’ and 
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‘…it has improved in the past 3-5 years’ is illustrated. This is a positive perception and 
sign for the USAF. One of reasons for the increase could be the additional instructors at 
the training units. More instructors were allocated to help alleviate the bottleneck and to 
improve the quality of training. The other reason for the increase in training could be 
attributed to the decrease in inspections. With less inspections the units can concentrate 
on training for the mission and not for inspections.  
The next three survey questions are separated into the following section because 
the results were unanimous.  
 
Figure 19: Culture Question 22 
 Responses for the USAF were 70 percent replied no, but it has improved in the 
past 5-10 years and 18 percent replied yes; whereas the USN had 91 percent responded 
0.00 0.50 1.00 1.50 2.00 2.50
USAF
USN
Culture Question 22: The following services have the proper focus 
on the nuclear mission
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yes and 9 percent was undecided. Once again the USN has an overwhelming advantage 
over the USAF. Two participants commented on this question.  
- “AF - needs Sr-lvl [Senior Level] (3/4-star) buy in (outside of 
AFGSC/AF/A10) USN - Needs to embrace outside of Navy 
reviews / observations of their inspections” 
 
-“ Creating the HAF/A10 is a positive step to improve the nuclear 
mission and, at the same time, a very negative one as it has the 
potential to remove authority from others in the pentagon that 
should grab nuclear as their number one priority. Therefore, we 
have one organization focused on nuclear 24X7 and other 
organizations that view the system as such...’CONVENTIONAL’ 
and ‘nuclear’.” 
 
Suggesting to share the nuclear ‘love’ in the Pentagon would increase awareness 
of the mission. Senior leaders and organizations, without the nuclear mission, do 
not have much interest in it; however, if the nuclear mission included these senior 
leaders and organizations, they may learn how important the nuclear mission is.  
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Figure 20: Organization Question 25 
The responses from the participants all agreed that there is no single organization 
in DoD that has complete oversight of the nuclear mission. One of the participants 
commented that “there is no single oversight of the entire nuclear mission, but 
USSTRATCOM has complete command over the operating force.” (Survey conducted by 
author, 2016). This question was asked because there was no single organization in the 
USAF that oversaw its nuclear enterprise, until AFGSC. Both AFGSC and SSP are the 
single organizations, in their respective services, with the nuclear mission. Both are 
proven to be successful. Would the nuclear enterprise benefit if the DoD had an 
organization that oversaw both USAF’s and USN’s nuclear enterprise? An assumption 
may be that the nuclear enterprise is too big for one organization in DoD to care and feed 
for it. 
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Organization Question 25: A single organization has complete 
oversight of DoD's nuclear enterprise
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Figure 21: Organization Question 26 
 Of the participants there were 9 agrees, 1 disagree and, 1 undecided. No 
comment was left for the one disagree, so speculation was suggested. Overall, the senior 
leaders state that AFGSC is a success.  
Survey 2  
 The results for this portion of the chapter are from AFGSC’s FIP survey. The 
specific questions pulled from the AFGSC’s survey relates to this research. There are 
more data points in the AFGSC’s FIP survey available for analysis which can be 
retrieved on its SharePoint page at 
https://org1.eis.af.mil/sites/afgsc/internal/FIP/default.aspx.  
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Organization Question 26: The standup of Air Force Global 
Strike Command (AFGSC) helped define the Air Force's nuclear 
mission/role
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 Air Force Global Strike’s FIP team conducted peer-to-peer interviews and group 
discussions to collect their data. For the survey results the 2014 Bomber FIP (BFIP) 
quantitative analysis is used. The FIP team interviewed 229 leaders and 4,190 non-
leaders. Both categories included enlisted and officer ranks (AFGSC BFIP slides 2-3, 
2014). There is no data in the survey that defines leader and non-leaders. The FIP team 
further divided their survey into five groups: mission support and medical, maintenance, 
operations, operations support, and security forces.  
 The FIP team asked if leaders have the qualifications and experience to make the 
correct decisions in the nuclear enterprise. The average response from the five groups 
was 48 percent concurrence, with the highest from the operational support at 60 percent 
and the lowest from maintenance at 41 percent (AFGSC BFIP slide 4, 2014). These 
results are comparable to the senior leaders that were surveyed. There is not a resounding 
agreement from the research’s survey and the FIP interview, but there is a positive 
perception that leadership’s experience and qualifications are improving.  
 The FIP team also inquired if the training requirements and programs adequately 
prepare the members of the unit to accomplish their mission (AFGSC BFIP slide 5, 
2014). The average response from the five groups was 43 percent concurrence, with the 
highest from the operational support at 67 percent and the lowest from security forces at 
29 percent. The quality of training still needs to improve at all levels in the nuclear 
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enterprise. Once again this perception from the unit level coincides with the senior 
leaders that were surveyed.  
 Perception is an example of how an implementation is considered to be 
successful. The expectation effect can explain the reasoning behind this. The expectation 
effect is “ways in which expectations affect perception and behavior. Generally, when 
people are aware of a probable or desired outcome, their perception and behavior are 
affected in some way.” (Lidwell, Holden and Butler 2003). A few examples of 
expectation effect are Halo Effect, Hawthorne Effect, Pygmalion Effect, Placebo Effect, 
and Rosenthal Effect (Lidwell, Holden and Butler 2003). If senior leaders desire a 
successful outcome, more effort will be exerted in the implementation. Senior leaders 
may increase communication on the implemented program and publicize how successful 
it is. The same perception is now echoed from MAJCOM to unit level organizations. In 
the opinion of this researcher, this is one of the reasons why communication is vital in the 
nuclear enterprise.  
Assessment: (Investigative Question 3) 
 Using the steps outlined in the previous chapter, KPIs are used to help 
organizations measure their goals or objectives. In the PAD and PPLAN for AFGSC the 
end-state was defined. Air Force Global Strike Command can build upon those end-state 
objectives, since that is the foundation of why AFGSC was stood up. Using strategic KPI, 
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a top down approach is used. The vision of AFGSC is developed by senior leaders and is 
defined as “Innovative leaders providing safe, secure and effective combat-ready forces 
for nuclear and conventional global strike…today and tomorrow!”  (Air Force Global 
Strike Command 2016). The strategic plan that supports the vision is “…establishing the 
impetus for nuclear deterrence and global strike operations.” (Air Force Global Strike 
Command 2016). Air Force Global Strike Command has three objectives: mission, 
airmen, and families. This report will use mission as the objective to continue to 
demonstrate KPIs. Within the mission there are several sub-areas defined to meet the 
main objective. One sub-area is “focus training to achieve and exceed standards.” (Air 
Force Global Strike Command 2016). At this point leadership needs to identify the CSFs. 
A question to ask is, what is the standard for training? Does AFGSC compare its training 
standards with the other MAJCOMs? Air Force Global Strike Command’s strategic plan 
defines two CSFs, which are referred to as measures of success. One of the CSFs AFGSC 
identifies is “Training requirements accomplished to a sufficient level to meet readiness 
requirements in accordance with OPLAN [Operations Plan] and AEF [Air & Space 
Expeditionary Force] taskings or as directed.” (Air Force Global Strike Command 2016). 
Now that a CSF for AFGSC is identified the KPI can be defined. Air Force Global Strike 
Command’s Strategic Plan has two KPIs defined, but refers to them as metrics. One of 
the KPIs identified is “Sufficient number of  CMR [Combat Mission Ready] crews 
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remain current on ground training events impacting CMR status in order to fulfill 
OPLAN and AEF taskings when executed as well as Designed Operational Capability 
statements (A3, NAF, Wing) [A3].” (Air Force Global Strike Command 2016). This KPI 
does not define a specific number of crews, because it is a classified number. This KPI 
identifies the number of crews needed, mandatory training events, and specifically what 
ground items affect CMR. If one of the areas falls below the specified number, then 
AFGSC has failed in its objective. If this trend would occur in all of AFGSC’s units, then 
AFGSC would fail on a larger scale. Continued failures may lead to other 
recommendations or actions enforced by senior leaders. An extreme example of a 
continued failure in the USAF’s nuclear mission could be to stand up an organization like 
USN’s SSP, where the nuclear mission is the only mission. Key performance indicators 
are used to continually assess the CSFs to ensure AFGSC remains successful.   
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“I think and think for months and years. Ninety-nine times, the conclusion is false. 
The hundredth time I am right.” 
-Albert Einstein 
V. Conclusions and Recommendations 
Chapter Overview 
 Research and analysis conducted in this study provide the foundation for final 
observations and recommendations. Research highlighted several challenges; however, 
the overall research questions were answered. Assessment of data gathered and analyzed 
identified shortcomings associated with the implementation of changes within the nuclear 
enterprise. Ultimately, the purpose of this chapter is to provide senior leaders with 
recommendations to enable continued success of the nuclear enterprise.  
Conclusions 
 Researching and synthesizing the nuclear reform reports was a vigorous, but 
humbling experience. Yet it served as a reminder of the strategic importance of the 
nuclear mission and how critical the Airmen, Sailors, Soldiers, Marines, and supporting 
organizations are to the nuclear enterprise. With that being said, it is a double edged 
sword. The same people who do their best to train, execute, and support the nuclear 
mission are equally capable of crippling it. The success of the nuclear enterprise is 
greatly attributed to those who unashamedly advocate for it. Top leaders (e.g. Secretary 
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of the Air Force and Secretary of Defense) consistently show their support by putting 
actions behind their words. Their support adds credibility to our senior leaders and to the 
nuclear enterprise.  
The CSF methodology was the best process identified for this study. Chapter 
three highlighted AFGSC as a very successful implementation. Air Force Global Strike 
Command is not the typical case analyzed in this study, because it was event driven by 
the 2007 and 2008 events instead of a process improvement. Nevertheless, it serves as an 
excellent example to explain a successful implementation. If the process of creating 
AFGSC can be documented in a formal manner, those same principles should easily 
apply to the processes on a much smaller scale.  
The goal of this study was to discover a process that was successful from the 
initial identification as an issue to Full Operational Capability (FOC) status. This proved 
to be unattainable since the initial identification is determined by a very senior group of 
leaders convening at a conference recognizing an issue. The issue then requires the senior 
leaders to reach a majority and agree on a decision. Without this decision, 
recommendations will never be considered. Information on the actual process within 
those senior leader conferences was not available for this study; therefore, a true 
beginning-to-end process analysis was not possible. However, process analysis was 
possible once recommendations were implemented.  
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Initially when this research paper was in the inception stage, the investigative 
questions were looking in the wrong areas. For example, investigative question one (IQ1) 
was; why are some recommendations implemented and others are not? As the research 
progressed, there was no concrete solution to this question. Investigative question one 
then changed to; what factors contribute to a successful implementation? Once again this 
was an unachievable question to answer. As the paper matured the questions evolved to 
reflect what the paper was really researching. The final IQ1 evolved into; what process is 
used to get a recommendation implemented? The question is still not answered, because 
once again there is no magic formula or set standard to answer the question. What was 
answered is, what process is necessary to ensure an implementation is successful? The 
answer is CSFs and KPIs, which occur after a recommendation is implemented. With that 
being said, there is no groundbreaking discovery of what makes a recommendation 
successful, the main outcome was just finding a process that increases success of an 
implementation.  
Significance of Research 
 Several papers describe how to develop CSFs for commercial organizations, but 
none of the papers describe how to apply the process to the DoD’s nuclear enterprise. 
This report provides a formal process to successfully implement recommendations and 
how to continually assess the implementation when it becomes FOC. Secondly, this 
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research tracked the current status of implementations, a task that many organizations do 
not undertake. For example, former SECAF Donley stated that the Nuclear Enterprise 
Advisory Panel (NEAP) would track the development of nuclear leaders with HAF/A10 
serving as the chair. However, information pertaining to the NEAP was absent; therefore, 
it appeared the implementation failed. In actuality, the NEAP was replaced by Nuclear 
Enterprise Senior Steering Group, which subsequently dissolved. Ultimately, the NEAC 
replaced both groups and is currently the agency who tracks and manages nuclear 
enterprise leaders. Consequently, in order for some implementations to be successful, 
they have to be modified during deployment in order to achieve the objectives. Lastly, 
this study’s survey garnered several comments from senior leaders that reiterated why 
there are still problems in the nuclear enterprise. These comments were included in 
chapter four to gain exposure.  
Recommendations for Action 
 Using the survey for this research and AFGSC’s interviews, a comparison study 
was conducted on the commonalities in the comments. The following recommendations 
came from that comparision.  
Recommendation 1   
The lack of nuclear education in the nuclear enterprise is identified in several 
reports. Even though some of the recommendations have been implemented, the 
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initiatives still missed the mark. Some of the survey comments state the scope of 
education is too broad while others have stated it as too narrow. There are several 
organizations that offer nuclear enterprise education; however, a major problem observed 
is the lack of collaboration between all of the organizations. The recommendation is that 
all of the organizations collaborate on courses they offer and develop a degree type 
program, thereby creating a nuclear university that any service member or civilian 
personnel can attend. The program should create three different levels (novice, 
intermediate, advanced) and offer classes at each level. As a student progresses through 
each level, they will become more immersed in nuclear experience as the studies become 
more in-depth. The first level would comprise the basic nuclear enterprise courses for a 
broad familiarization. The second level would require students to grasp concepts such as 
deterrence and assurance, space and cyber operations, and nuclear weapons orientation. 
The third level would consist of courses like nuclear policy, strategy, and international 
relationships. The degree or certificate program would also require a minimum number of 
electives in each level to be accomplished. This university offers the student the 
flexibility and focus necessary to add value to their organization or career. This university 
does not have to be centrally located. The schoolhouses can remain regional, i.e. in their 
current locations, because each location would have something unique to offer. This 
university should also include the national labs (Sandia, Livermore, Los Alamos, etc.) 
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due to their resources and classes they offer. For example, Sandia has several classes that 
its weapon intern program students attend. The nuclear university should allow all 
National Nuclear Security Administration and the Department of Energy employees the 
opportunity to attend as well. This effort to include the national laboratories and other 
organizations will boost collaboration and strengthen the nuclear community.  
Recommendation 2  
The results of the survey for this research suggested that the USN outperformed 
the USAF in most categories. The reports reviewed for this research paper have also 
suggested that the USN’s SSP has the right mindset and organizational structure for the 
nuclear enterprise. One observation was that the USN has a single voice for their nuclear 
mission: the Director of SSP. The Director of SSP is a flag officer who is steeped in the 
nuclear enterprise, highly qualified, and solely focused on the nuclear mission. The single 
mission for SSP has allowed the USN to excel in almost every aspect. My 
recommendation is to commit the necessary aircraft and crews at a B-52 wing and at a B-
2 wing to the nuclear mission. This will allow the wings or squadrons to be focused on 
the nuclear mission. Going back to a SAC type of mentality will help increase the quality 
and experience of the Airmen supporting the mission. The maintainers and crews from 
the conventional missions should be allowed to transfer into the nuclear units. This will 
bring a diversity of thought to the nuclear culture. This diversity will enable the nuclear 
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mission to thrive by incorporating different points of view and improved processes. The 
Airmen committed to the mission should remain in the nuclear enterprise to maintain and 
increase their experience. These Airmen will develop into the nuclear experts and leaders 
that the USAF desperately needs. Secondly, having bomber squadrons dedicated to the 
nuclear mission will increase the U.S.’s nuclear posture by facilitating a hybrid warfare. 
A hybrid warfare blends conventional, nuclear, cyber, and irregular warfare, which 
exploits the ‘full-spectrum’ of threats (F. G. Hoffman 2009). A suggestion for a future 
research paper is to explore the value of hybrid warfare to the nuclear enterprise. 
Summary 
In the past two decades the nuclear enterprise has slowly eroded. Every issue, big 
or small, has taken its toll on leadership, the culture, organizations, and training. It 
appears all of the issues were swept under the rug to hide the symptoms. The two major 
incidents in 2007 and 2008 raised a red flag. The nuclear enterprise was now being 
noticed, but not for positive accolades. Several reports on the nuclear enterprise were 
published and hundreds of recommendations were made. One of the more well-known 
successful recommendations is the creation of AFGSC. This case was used in the 
research to describe the process from the beginning to present day. This example was 
used because the documents were made available for public release and there were 
sufficient sources that documented the process. In chapter four surveys and interviews 
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were used to add depth to the research. The surveys, interviews, and recommendations 
were then synthesized to compare results. In order to reduce bias, senior leaders, mid-
level commanders, supervisors, and subordinates were included. The analysis suggested 
that regardless of rank or position was, comments and perceptions were similar. Finally, 
recommendations were made to help improve the nuclear enterprise. Using the methods 
and process described in this paper will help ensure the success of future 
implementations. 
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Appendix A: DoD Nuclear Weapons Management Phase I: The Air Force’s Nuclear 
Mission 
 
 KEY: L = Leadership; C=Culture; O=Organization; T=Training 
 
DoD Nuclear Weapons Management Phase I: The Air Force's Nuclear Mission 
(2008) 
LC AF provides periodic reports on improving nuclear weapons management 
LC Review nuclear related instructions; ensure current, consistent, sufficient 
LC 
 IG involvement in the process of developing Op and procedural guidelines for 
nuclear-related inspections 
LC 
Policy for frequency and min acceptable levels of participation and designate 
central waiver authority for nuclear ex 
LC AFIG spearhead the overhaul and standardization of nuclear inspection process 
LC 
CSAF establish guidance for conduct of SAVs and ensure it is properly sourced 
and staffed w/experts 
LC 
SECAF provide resources necessary for initiatives required to upgrade/revitalize 
the nuclear msn 
LC AF/A1 define nuclear-critical billets and ID critical nuclear positions 
LC AF/A1 establish manpower standards for all career fields support nuclear mission 
LC 
AF/A1 Airman assigned to key ops unit nuclear billet should be "deployed in 
place" 
LC AF/A give the CC option to reclama voluntary deployment requests 
LC 
SECAF provide guidance to successive promotion and special selection boards; 
need to promote nuclear Amn 
LC AF/A1 authorize intel officers to each of the missile wings and to HQ 20AF 
LC AETC conduct a curriculum review of PME to include nuclear matters subjects 
LC 
Conduct more small-scale wargames aimed at shaping internal attitudes on 
nuclear weapons 
LC 
Est school for nuclear ops focused on professional excellence in deterrence 
missions 
LC CSAF establish senior mentor program for nuclear ops  
O Redesignate AFSPC to AFSTRAT 
O SECAF and CSAF direct the assign of all AF bombers in 8AF 
O 
SECAF and CSAF direct removal of all non-bomber related missions from 8th 
AF 
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O Reassignment of 8AF from ACC to AFSTRAT 
O 
Review and validation of manning and resourcing of AFSTRAT HQ, ACC HQ, 
ICBM/Bomber NAFs, Wings 
O Review NAF grade structure to ensure equitable w/other NAFs 
O 
Designate AFMC CC as Executive Agent for AF nuclear weapons and related 
material 
O 
Strengthen Air Staff oversight and policy function by adding 1-star billet to 
AF/A3/5N 
O 
AF/A4/A7 develop guidance to create category of assets encompasses sensitive 
nuclear delivery system 
O 
ICBM expertise should be required when filling senior leadership within 526th 
ICMB Group 
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Appendix B: DoD Nuclear Weapons Management Phase II: Review of the DoD 
Nuclear Mission 
 
  
DoD Nuclear Weapons Management Phase II: Review of the DoD Nuclear 
Mission (2008) 
C DTRA to seize DNSIs and only conduct Service Proficiency Evaluations 
C 
Develop specific guidance for evaluating PRP for units not subject to 
inspection 
O SECDEF reduce the number of missions assigned to USSTRATCOM 
O 
AF/A1 and A10 develop policy to ensure personnel assigned to nuclear 
units remain on station for a min period 
T 
All USAF Weapons grads in dual role demonstrate same level of prof in 
nuclear weapons employment as the conv msn 
O Designate flag-level officer on Joint Staff, sole focus on the nuclear msn 
O 
Joint Staff update joint nuclear ops doctrine and develop nuclear deterrence 
joint ops concept 
O 
Joint Staff sponsor senior-level exercises on three levels; military, 
military/OSD, whole of gov't 
O 
Expand responsibilities of the Nuclear Weapon Council to include issues 
involving the full range of nuclear capabilities, including weapons, delivery 
systems, infrastructure, policy implementation, and resources 
O 
Nuclear Weapon Council develop and maintain a nuclear capabilities 
roadmap for the modernization and sustainment of the nuclear deterrent 
force (deterrence policy, forces, and infrastructure) 
O 
Validate operational requirements for providing capabilities to include 
modernizing or replacing the capabilities now provided by Dual-Capable 
Aircraft, ALCM, and TLAM-N 
C 
Establish a requirement for biennial self-assessment of the Nay nuclear 
weapons enterprise 
LO 
Expand role of the Director of SSP as the single authority for nuclear 
weapons programs and operations, and elevate the position of the SSP to a 
three-star billet 
C 
Direct a nuclear weapon enterprise manning and experience study to 
examine the shrinking experience base (NAVY) 
T 
Review and expand professional military education curricula on concepts of 
nuclear deterrence, strategy, planning, and operational theory (NAVY) 
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T 
Require a greater number of Naval officers to complete appropriate 
educational programs to sustain expertise required to support leadership and 
staff billets in deterrence policy and strategy positions as well as nuclear 
ops and technical matter 
O 
Implement the proposals for additional manpower billets required to restore 
SSBN squadrons and submarine groups, including the reestablishment of 
the group commander positions and full staffs on both coasts 
O 
Review TACAMO wing manning and billet funding status to ensure the 
wings are appropriately manned at 100 percent of “wartime” levels 
O 
Review SSP civilian and military manning and provide sufficient resources 
for proper oversight in light of additional missions 
T 
Fully resource all support elements for the TACAMO mission, including 
trainers and mobile reconstitution capability equipment 
O 
Reduce the number of missions assigned to USSTRATCOM, limiting them 
primarily to the deterrence, global strike, and space missions 
L  
USSTRATCOM, if at all possible, should be filled with a general or flag 
officer with significant operational nuclear experience 
O 
Institutionalize the role of USSTRATCOM as the lead combatant command 
advocating for capability development, requirements, and resources for both 
strategic and theater nuclear systems 
O 
USEUCOM staff with nuclear weapons responsibilities should be fully 
manned with nuclear-experienced personnel 
O 
The Secretary of the Air Force should direct that USAFE retain control of 
the  Weapons Storage Security Systems (WS3) in Europe rather than 
placing them under control of the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center 
T 
Direct the Air Force Education and Training Command to train all aircrew 
that will be assigned to DCA to  be fully qualified in nuclear operations 
upon completion of initial qualification 
O 
Designate a flag-level officer on the Joint Staff whose sole focus is the 
nuclear mission. Staffing and resourcing for the Joint Staff functions of 
nuclear strategy, plans, policies, exercises, and analysis should be increased 
T 
The Joint Staff should sponsor senior level exercises on three levels: within 
the military, military/OSD, and whole of government 
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APPENDIX C: DoD Defense Science Board Independent Assessment of the Air 
Force Nuclear Enterprise 
 
  
Defense Science Board: Independent Review of AF Nuclear Enterprise 
(2011) 
L 
AF leadership should maintain realistic expectations regarding state of acct 
for NWRM 
L Needs of the nuclear enterprise to sustain the force are given priority 
L 
Funding and program authorize to logistics essential to nuclear deterrence 
msn commensurate w/priority of nuclear deterrence msn 
L Urgent attention to 40+ warhead and missile mx support and test equip 
  
Assign all base-level ops and logistics function to strategic missile and bomb 
wings thru NAF to AFGSC 
C 
Intense inspections regime is sharply refocused on areas of continuing 
concern rather than serving as substitute chain of CC 
C 
Normal inspections schedule, single NSI each 18mo and NORI each 18 mo. 
DNSIs as needed 
C 
Follow-up re-inspections and special inspections conducted only to address 
unsatisfactory ratings or sign negative trends 
C 
Provide qualified people to operating forces in career fields that are both 
fragile and critical to nuclear msn 
C 
Immediate adjustment to AF guidance/practices to remove PRP-based 
restrictions and monitoring  
C Reexamination of the continued utility of set of special HQ org 
C # of inspectors from multiple org is tailored to the size and complexity  
O 
A1 direct a zero-base assessment of the logistics center and op unit 
engineering and mx manpower requirement of aging equipment 
O 
Public relations and promotional messages include nuclear forces portraying 
AF msn and focus 
O 
CC at all levels frequently reinforce the primacy of the nuclear deterrence 
msn w/communication HQ, MAJCOM, and nuclear forces 
O 
AFGSC CC moving adhoc approach to meet the nuclear bomber commitment 
to a formal program  
O 
Trust technicians judgement vs risk avoidance on cosmetic defects w/tech 
data and training program judgement 
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O 
Provide on-site engineering support until processes are in place to separate 
cosmetic defects 
O 
USAFE A3 provide clarity on elements of DCA that require continuous 
readiness  
O Id disconnects between NATO and USAF directives  
O 
AFGSC complete ongoing work to supplement AFIs as needed to provide 
clear direction for nuclear weapons ops 
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APPENDIX D: DoD Defense Science Board Air Force Nuclear Enterprise Follow-
On Review 
 
  Defense Science Board: AF Nuclear Enterprise Follow-On Review(2013) 
L 
Establish quarterly newsletter informing the operational forces of 
completed actions and plans underway to support equip and other logistics 
needs, changes in policy, and resource updates 
L 
Include media appropriate to the intended audience to continuously update 
information relevant to the concerns of the workforce 
O 
Dep Assistant SEDEF for Nuclear Matters should lead an effort to eliminate 
the non-productive workload and unnecessary handling of nuclear 
components 
T 
Direct full funding of development of publication of changes, updates, and 
rewrite of Technical Orders support nuclear operations 
T 
Ensure revised Technical Orders are vetted by hands-on experts before 
publication 
O 
AFGSC CC should ensure the supply specialists provide to the wings for 
the purpose of helping establish special supply levels to deal with nuclear 
systems 
T 
Give high priority to the development of a weapons training facility for 
cruise missile launcher training at Minot 
O 
AFGSC and HAF/A1 should create and implement a manning standard that 
addresses the unique characteristics of a missile wing operating over 
thousands of square miles 
CO 
Review and update DoD 5210.42R to provide clarity in baseline 
requirement assuring that the PRP is implemented as a CC's program w/ 
clear accountability for determining the fitness for duty of people subject to 
the PRP 
OT 
HAF A1 establish a procedure to ensure when assigning personnel to PRP 
positions there is an early termination to personnel who do not qualify 
LO 
The Commanders, AFGSC and Air Force Inspection Agency (AFIA) 
should strongly enforce the concept that the wing commander is responsible 
for a self-inspection program that ensures that the commander knows the 
mission and compliance status of wing capabilities and an important 
function of the inspection team is to validate or identify discrepancies 
relevant to the wing commander’s assessment 
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O 
HAF A1 in coordination with the AFIA should assess the additional 
manpower needs for an effective self-inspection program 
LO 
The Secretary and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force should clearly declare 
the primacy of the authority of the mission chain-of-command accountable 
for the performance of the mission and the priority accorded the mission 
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APPENDIX E: Independent Review of the DoD Nuclear Enterprise  
 
  
Independent Review of the DoD Nuclear Enterprise (2014) WELCH-
HARVEY REPORT 
L 
Direct quarterly meetings w/ leadership on progress toward complying w/ 
the SECDEF's direction on various corrective actions. 
L 
On a regular and sustained basis, make it clear to all of the DOD that 
nuclear forces remain an essential underpinning of U.S. national security. 
L 
Est & support programs that maintain high awareness of verbal & written 
public declarations that question the need for nuclear forces and respond 
with equally public declarations. 
O 
Direct that the loosely federated nuclear activities within OSD and the Air 
Force be brought together into a coherent and synchronized structure that 
focuses on direction and support for the nuclear forces 
L 
Establish that the nuclear mission has first priority and that the priority is to 
be reflected in personnel, logistics, and funding support 
LC 
Direct that the Services address, in detail, the disconnects between 
expectations of meeting mission demands and the obstacles to meeting 
those expectations imposed by micromanagement, distracting emphasis on 
preparing for inspections, inefficiencies introduced by multiple directions 
from multiple sources—technical orders, instructions, higher headquarters 
directives, manuals—and the plethora of requirements that do not 
contribute directly to the mission 
C 
Direct the operational chain of command to filter non-mission direction 
instead of adding to the excess load on the mission forces 
CT 
Direct that manning assessments address, in detail, the disconnect between 
available manning qualified to perform mission tasks and the total workload 
imposed by the mission and by issues addressed in the preceding 
recommendation 
LC 
Direct that the most basic needs for Sailors and Airmen and their families 
receive priority attention—repairing broken equipment, adequate clothing 
for cold-weather conditions, vehicle maintenance, and providing support 
services (e.g., childcare center hours, commissary hours, fitness center 
hours, medical services) 
C 
Direct that in addition to attention to the performance of the unit, inspection 
teams evaluate and report on the quality of higher headquarters’ support for 
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the unit’s mission accomplishment and on those processes, procedures, and 
practices that are obstacles to mission performance 
LC 
Bluntly and openly acknowledge the problems that have continued to 
develop since additional focus was placed on the nuclear enterprise in 2007-
2008 
LC 
Clearly and forcefully, give the force your personal commitment to closing 
the current institutional “say-do gap.” 
LC 
Direct a move from a culture of micromanagement by commanders and 
supervisors to a culture of empowerment of qualified people to do their 
critical work 
LC 
Hold senior leaders accountable for the required actions to assure both the 
confidence of the force and confidence in the force 
OE 
Make it clear to all that individual behavior is a matter of personal 
responsibility and that failure to meet performance and behavior norms is a 
military discipline issue to be addressed by commanders 
LC 
The Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) should 
ensure that the Director, Naval Reactors provides an in-depth report on 
actions to address the broader organizational, cultural, and institutional 
leadership issues contributing to the cheating incident at the Nuclear 
Training Unit (Prototype) and cheating incidents that have occurred 
elsewhere in the Fleet 
LC 
The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force 
(CSAF) should ensure that training and skill testing is focused on 
measuring whether the Sailor or Airman’s knowledge is necessary and 
sufficient for the mission, but does not devolve into a counterproductive 
continuous demand for higher grades 
  Initiate a program to enhance recognition and reward for ICBM duty 
O 
Direct that, on a continuing basis, officers completing their initial missile 
combat crew assignment, in excess of those needed for extended 13N duty 
specify three choices of follow on career paths with assurance of selection 
for one of the three 
LC 
Consider special pay for personnel who regularly perform duty deployed 
from the home base to the missile field 
LC Increase field grade presence in ICBM operational squadrons 
C 
Return full authority to the Missile Combat Crew Commander for execution 
of the specified duties of the Combat Crew 
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O 
clarify the roles of the OSD and Joint Staff and realign the structure within 
OSD and the Joint Staff to meet the need to synchronize nuclear activities 
across DOD to include addressing issues of policy, strategy, mission, 
platforms, weapons, and support 
O 
create a coherent and specialized nuclear enterprise focus encompassing Air 
Force headquarters, Air Force Materiel Command, U.S. Air Forces in 
Europe, and Air Force Global Strike Command 
O 
Ensure that supply chain expertise is integrated into those units (e.g., 
maintenance squadrons) that require the knowledge to effectively and 
efficiently work within the supply system to address units’ supply needs 
LC 
initiate the actions recommended for the Secretary of Defense in Section II 
of this report, and be clearly seen by their respective forces to have taken 
ownership of the nuclear mission 
L 
Provide guidance that the first priority for commanders is to empower those 
under their command to perform the nuclear deterrent mission effectively 
and efficiently, and there will be no tolerance for practices that place risk of 
criticism above risk to the mission 
LC 
Effective and efficient execution of the mission demands that commanders 
and supervisors empower their people by driving decisions down to the 
lowest level qualified for the decisions 
C 
The preferred corrective action for errors is to correct, not punish, the 
Sailor, Airman, or Marine’s performance with additional information, 
training, or hands-on supervision appropriate to the situation 
CT 
Provide the support (to include investment) needed for the men and women 
in the force to meet the professional demands of their daily work consistent 
with the declared priority of the mission 
LC 
Empower all levels of command and supervision to use their professional 
expertise and judgment to execute the mission within established guidelines 
and directives 
O 
clearly establish that the A1 community is accountable to the Chief of Staff 
and to commanders for forecasting and filling personnel needs with the 
functional managers contributing to career development and providing 
advice as needed but not direction 
C 
Eliminate the requirement for additional agencies to inspect in parallel with 
Service inspection teams 
C 
Transfer responsibility for oversight inspections of Service inspections from 
DTRA to USSTRATCOM and USEUCOM 
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C 
Require that inspection reports provide useful information to commanders 
at all levels on what and how the unit is doing, what the higher headquarters 
and support organizations are doing for the unit and, what the structure 
outside the unit is doing that makes mission execution more difficult and 
more costly to the Sailors, Airmen, and Marines who perform the mission 
C 
Differentiate sharply between inspections and assistance visits by ensuring 
that assistance visits respond to specific needs identified by the unit 
commander, rather than to the higher headquarters staff, and that reports 
generated by such visits are for the unit commander to use as the 
commander sees fit 
C 
direct the Navy and Air Force formal training activities to develop 
capability to require a hands-on demonstration of skills before graduation in 
addition to heavily computer-based training and testing 
C 
Establish and institutionalize across Headquarters Air Force and Air Force 
Materiel Command that responding to Air Force Global Strike Command 
needs is their highest priority with near-term demonstrations of support that 
are immediately visible to the nuclear forces 
T 
Significantly strengthen the influence of the Air Force Global Strike 
Command in setting and sustaining priorities, ensuring effective follow-
through on solutions to needs and issues, and in conveying the importance 
of the nuclear deterrent mission 
O 
The strongly preferred option to address this issue is to elevate the 
Commander, Air Force Global Strike Command to a four-star position 
O 
If the preferred option is not possible, an alternative is to retain the current 
Air Force Global Strike Command structure but create a four-star Air Force 
Strategic Command with broad strategic forces responsibility, authority, 
and accountability with Air Force Global Strike Command as one of the 
subordinate commands 
O 
establish that the ICBM Launch Facility and Launch Control Center are 
integral parts of the ICBM weapon system 
L 
communicate the nuclear investment plans and programs, near-, mid-, and 
longer-term to ensure that Sailors, Airmen, and Marines performing the 
nuclear mission know what to expect beyond visible progress in support of 
field operations 
O 
direct that the Services invoke commander’s right to arm authority as the 
standard to determine the reliability of nuclear security forces and eliminate 
the application of the PRP for nuclear security forces 
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OC 
Direct that the inspection teams are to determine that proper PRP processes 
and procedures are in place to inform commanders and for commanders to 
take appropriate action. Inspectors are not to audit records 
O 
Establishing that people qualified under PRP remain qualified with changes 
of station until there is an explicit reason to doubt continued qualification. 
A new station with new duties or an interval between PRP required 
assignments is not such a reason 
C 
Establishing that only cause, not the potential for cause is reason for 
suspension from PRP 
CO 
Charging commanders and supervisors, not the PRP monitor and medical 
community, with the responsibility to know their people and their issues 
that could affect fitness for duty 
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APPENDIX F: Reinvigorating the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise 
  Nuclear Enterprise Roadmap (2008) 
O 
Consolidate all nuclear sustainment functions under AFMC/AFNWC. 
(OPR):AFMC, create Mission Directive 
OT 
Establish positive inventory control measures for nuclear weapons-related 
materiel. 
OC 
Enhance Nuclear Inspection processes: establish an AF-wide inspector 
training and certification program; implement independent oversight of all 
command-level NSIs by SAF/IG; establish a centrally managed core team 
of highly experienced NSI inspectors; establish procedures for 
adjudicating discrepancies between MAJCOM and oversight teams 
T 
Align strategic deterrence/nuclear operations-based education, training, 
career development and force development activities 
O 
Increase nuclear mission focus, by placing all ICBMs and nuclear-capable 
bombers into a single command: establish Air Force Global Strike 
Command 
O 
Increase USAF institutional nuclear focus, policy oversight, integration 
and establish air staff nuclear accountable officer 
O 
Improve nuclear stewardship in AF corporate processes: Consolidate 
nuclear related Program Elements into one panel or a similarly robust 
management portfolio; revise Group, Board, Panel and Council structure; 
develop a beta-test nuclear enterprise virtual Major Force Program 
O 
Create strategic plans that address long-term nuclear 
requirements…Cruise Missile; Bomber; DCA; ICBM 
O 
Charge the Under Secretary of the Air Force with ongoing broad policy 
and oversight responsibilities for nuclear matters 
O 
The Secretary of the Air Force establishes policy for nuclear matters. The 
SECAF and CSAF will jointly chair the Air Force Nuclear Oversight 
Board (NOB) which shall meet at least quarterly to resolve outstanding 
issues, and specifically to: 1.) oversee implementation of this roadmap, 
and report progress to SECDEF and Congress; 2.) review nuclear policies, 
standards, performance metrics, and compliance; and 3.) ensure 
continuing effective stewardship of the Air Force nuclear enterprise 
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C 
Rebuild a culture of accountability and rigorous self-assessment dedicated 
to high standards of excellence in the Air Force nuclear enterprise 
LT Rebuild nuclear expertise and codify career paths 
O 
Construct an end-to-end Air Force nuclear sustainment enterprise system 
and revitalize the sustainment community 
  
Develop a comprehensive investment plan committed to meeting the 
requirements of the nuclear deterrence mission 
LT 
Create an environment of sustained advocacy for the nuclear deterrence 
mission 
  
Align authorities and responsibilities for nuclear deterrence mission 
requirements 
LC 
Leadership at all levels must make nuclear mission oversight and self-
assessment their highest priority 
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APPENDIX G: Report Comparison Chart 
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APPENDIX H: Survey Questions Results 
The following charts were not illustrated in the main research paper, so they are 
made available here for a reference.  
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Culture Question 20 is omitted from the report due to the question containing For 
Official Use Only information.  
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APPENDIX I: Graduate Research Paper Storyboard 
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